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I. INTRODUCTION
In a growing response to psychotherapist-patient sexual rela-
tions, the major mental health organizations have universally
condemned sexual contact in therapeutic relationships as exploit-
ative, proclaiming, "It's [n]ever O.K."' The Code of Ethics adopted
by the American Psychiatric Association states emphatically that
"sexual contact with the patient is unethical. '2 The American
1. In 1984, the Minnesota legislature appointed a task force to study the problem of
sexual exploitation by counselors and therapists. See MINN. STAT. S 631 (1984). The task
force produced three publications. See THE STATE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
BY COUNSELORS AND THERAPISTS, IT'S NEVER O.K.: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY COUNSELORS
AND THERAPISTS (1987) [hereinafter MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S NEVER O.K.]; MINNESOTA PUB.
EDUC. WORK GROUP OF THE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY COUNSELORS AND
THERAPISTS, IT'S NEVER O.K.: A HANDBOOK FOR VICTIMS AND VICTIM ADVOCATES ON SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION (1988) [hereinafter MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S NEVER O.K.: A HANDBOOK FOR
VICTIMS]; MINNESOTA TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY COUNSELORS AND THERA-
PISTS, IT'S NEVER O.K.: A HANDBOOK FOR PROFESSIONALS ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY
COUNSELORS AND THERAPISTS (13. Sanderson ed. 1989) [hereinafter MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S
NEVER O.K.: PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK]; See also G. SCHOENER, J. MILOROM, J. GONSIOREK,
E. LUEPKER, & R. CONROE, PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH CLIENTS: IN-
TERVENTION AND PREVENTION (1989) [hereinafter G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM].
2. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY S 2, at 4 (1985).
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Psychological Association's Rules of Ethics provide that "sexual
intimacies with clients are unethical." The National Association
of Social Workers' Code of Ethics proclaims that "social worker[s]
should under no circumstances engage in sexual activities with
clients."4 The American Psychoanalytic Association has issued a
similar prohibition.5
Even the Hippocratic oath6 prohibits sexual contact and has
found its way into the common law. In Andrews v. United States,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit de-
termined that the defendant exceeded the boundaries of the oath
when he had a sexual relationship with his client during coun-
seling sessions" and stated:
The Hippocratic oath states, "In every house where I come, I
will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far
from all intentional ill-doing and all seduction, and especially
from the pleasures of love with women and men." Although
not a basis for liability in this case, the Hippocratic oath is
indicative of the medical profession's historic knowledge of and
concern about the potential for sexual abuse of the physician-
patient relationship. 9
Despite its historic prohibition, psychotherapists' sexual con-
tact with patients occurs. Before 1975, psychotherapist malprac-
tice suits were rare.10 A plaintiff brought the first known civil
action concerning a therapist's improprieties with a patient in a
3. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS 6(a) (1980).
4. NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, INC., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL Asso-
CIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS 5 (1980).
5. See AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS
(1983).
6. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 579 (3d ed. 1972).
7. 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984) (patient sued therapist for malpractice after a sexual
relationship with the therapist).
8. Id. at 368.
9. Id. at 368 n.2 (citing STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 579). For further discussion
of the prohibitions imposed by the Hippocratic oath, see Campbell, The Oath: An Inves-
tigation of the Injunction Prohibiting Physician-Patient Sexual Relations, 32 PERSP. BIo. &
MED. 300 (1989).
10. See Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975) (patient
sued prominent psychiatrist for malpractice and assault for engaging her in sexual
relationship). This case made front page news and brought the issue of psychotherapist-
patient sexual exploitation to the public's attention. The case also resulted in the
publication of a book and a made-for-television movie. See L. FREEMAN & J. ROY, BETRAYAL
(1976).
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1961 English case, Landau v. Werner." From this landmark case
until the mid-1970's, few cases were reported.12 The 1980's, how-
ever, brought a flood of cases and much publicity. 3 Now, psy-
chotherapists' sexual involvement with patients is a leading cause
of psychotherapist malpractice claims 4 and, between 1976 and
1986, was the most frequent source of litigation against psychol-
ogists insured under the American Psychological Association. 15
11. 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961) (psychiatrist found negligent for pursuing social relationship
with client, even though relationship did not involve sexual relations).
12. See Roy, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297; Annotation, Civil Liability of Doctor or
Psychologist for Having Sezual Relationship with Patient, 33 A.L.R.3D 1393 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Horak v. Biris,
130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985). In 1981, a jury awarded a patient-plaintiff $4.6
million, the highest damage award to date in a psychotherapist malpractice case. Walker
v. Parzen, 24 ATLA L. REP. 295 (1981). Victims of sexual abuse have written several
books. See, e.g., C. BATES & A. BRODSKY, SEX IN THE THERAPY HOUR (1989); E. PLASIL,
THERAPIST (1985); E. WALKER & P.D. YOUNG, A KILLING CURE (1986).
14. Pert, Medicolegal Aspects of Professional Sexual Exploitation, in SEXUkL EXPLOITA-
TION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 211, 212 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989).
15. G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra, note 1, at 538. "From 1976 to 1986, sexual
intimacy with clients was the most frequent cause of suits against psychologists insured
under the American Psychological Association's policy; the suits accounted for 44.8/0 of
all monies ($7,019,165) paid in response to claims." Id. (citation omitted).
Although insurers have attempted to exclude sexual contact from coverage, they have
not been successful under policy language that reads "arising out of the performance of
professional services rendered or which should have been rendered, during the policy
period, by the Insured." See, e.g., Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga.
App. 215, 217, 296 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1982) (emphasis omitted); see also Vigilant Ins. Co. v.
Employers Ins., 626 F. Supp. 262, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (construing an identical insurance
policy clause); Mazza v. Medical Mutual Ins. Co., 319 S.E.2d 217, 219 (N.C. 1984) (same
provision); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(identical clause). In Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 447 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989), the court reversed a motion for summary judgment that the trial court
granted and held that the liability policy did not per se exclude coverage when the
therapist became emotionally and sexually involved with a patient. Id. at 10. The plaintiffs
expert, Gary Schoener, concluded that the therapist's rendering of services was negligent
in the following ways:
(1) improper and non-therapeutic disclosure of the therapist's personal prob-
lems to the patient; (2) therapist's failure to adequately recognize and deal
with emotional transference and countertransference; (3) therapist's failure
to monitor his personal health, preventing effective therapy; (4) therapist's
attempting to personally counsel client to "fix" the results of therapist's
sexual involvement; and (5) failure to provide outside therapeutic intervention
for problems arising from the sexual involvement.
Id. at 7.
The court distinguished cases involving medical doctors from those involving mental
health therapists who become sexually involved with their patients. Id. at 9. The court
stated that in therapist cases, "[tihere is no clear dichotomy between the professional
purpose and all of the alleged tortious acts. Alleged breaches of the professional obligation,
if proved, are departures related to the therapy itself. . . . The sexual acts are an
incidental outgrowth of the primary malpractice, not the proximate cause." Id. at 9-10.
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Recognizing the unique nature of the therapist-patient rela-
tionship and its potential for sexual abuse, state legislatures and
licensing boards have altered their handling of these cases.16
Since 1983, several states have specifically proscribed psycho-
therapists' sexual contact with their patients through criminal,
civil, and licensing regulations. 17 Other states are now considering
these types of regulations.'
This Article examines the unique nature of the psychotherapist
relationship, which potentially leads to sexual abuse, and it ana-
lyzes the relevant criminal, civil, and licensing board statutes
enacted throughout the United States. Section II discusses the
problem of sexual contact in the therapeutic relationship. This
Section discusses the therapist's role as fiduciary and the rela-
tional power imbalance between the parties and provides an
overview of the psychological phenomena of transference and
countertransference. Section II also reviews empirical data on
psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation and presents the types
of injuries that victims suffer. Through a review of criminal laws,
The court noted, however, that insurers did have the right to exclude specifically certain
types of malpractice claims from the terms of their policies. Id. at 10 (citing Govar v.
Chicago Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 1581 (8th Cir. 1989)).
In Govar, the therapist's insurance policy contained the following language:
This insurance does not apply to claims arising out of any sexual act or acts
performed or alleged to have been performed by the named insured. How-
ever, notwithstanding the foregoing, the insured shall be protected under
the terms of this policy for any claim upon which suit may be brought
against him, for any such alleged act or acts by the Insured unless a judgment
or final adjudication adverse to the Insured shall establish that such act or
acts occurred as an essential element of the cause of action so adjudicated.
Govar, 879 F.2d at 1582. The court held that this clause barred the patient's claim against
the therapist's insurance company, as the patient's "entire case centered on sex." Id. at
1583 (emphasis added).
In another sexual exploitation case, however, a court allowed a patient to recover from
the malpractice insurer even though the insurance policy specifically excluded sexual
misconduct. Cranford Ins. Co. v. Allwest Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
The court recognized the patient's argument that concurrent proximate causes led to her
injuries, specifically, the therapist's mishandling of transference, which the policy ex-
cluded, and the therapist's abandonment of the patient, which the policy did not exclude.
Id. at 1444. The court noted that, under California law, when an insured risk and an
excluded risk constitute concurrent proximate causes of an injury, a liability insurer is
liable if the policy covers one of the causes. Id.
16. Seven states have passed criminal statutes proscribing therapist-patient sexual
contact. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text. Four states have enacted civil
causes of action. See infra notes 386-426 and accompanying text. Several states have
modified their licensing and disciplinary procedures. For a more extensive discussion, see
infra notes 470-547.
17. See id.
18. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Section III examines trends in the criminalization of sexual ex-
ploitation, including an analysis of seven recent statutes proscrib-
ing psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation. Section IV
explores the common law and four state statutes addressing
psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation, as well as such an-
cillary concerns as statutes of limitations, employer liability, and
civil "victim shield" provisions. Section V provides an overview
of current administrative statutes and exposes the features of
board regulation, the scope of power, and the range of sanctions
available. This Section also discusses related issues, including
burden of proof, statutes of limitations, mandatory reporting, and
victim shield provisions within the context of board regulations.
Section VI concludes that no existing remedy adequately protects
patients from the growing problem of psychotherapist sexual
exploitation and that a combination of remedies within a com-
prehensive legal scheme is therefore necessary.19
II. UNIQUE NATURE OF THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP
A. Therapist as Fiduciary
Because he possesses special expertise, a professional often
owes a fiduciary duty to his clients. 20 A fiduciary relationship
"arises whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domi-
nation and influence result on the other."21 A fiduciary is never
19. Throughout this Article, the authors refer to the psychotherapist as "he" and the
victim as "she." These references are a reader's aid and are not intended to imply that
sexual exploitation of male patients is somehow less important than sexual exploitation
of females. The vast majority of sexual exploitation cases reported, however, involve a
male therapist and a female patient. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (surveys
by representatives of psychiatric, psychological, and social work organizations indicate
that almost 90% of offenders are male and a similar percentage of the victims are
female).
20. See, e.g., Horak v. Biris, 130 IMl. App. 3d 140, 145, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1985) (social
worker is fiduciary to clients and must refrain from harmful actions); Plaquemines Parish
Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1039-40 (La. 1987) (relationships
between attorney and client and between public official and his constituency are fiduciary);
Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah App. Ct. 1989) (attorneys and doctors are
fiduciaries because of special expertise).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990); see also Erickson v. Christenson, 99
Or. App. 104, 108, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (1989). In reversing the dismissal of a claim against
a clergyman for sexual exploitation in a counseling relationship, the court stated, "Because
he was plaintiffs pastor and counselor, a special relationship of trust and confidence
developed." Id. (emphasis omitted). The court stressed that the breach of fiduciary duty
was a breach of a confidential relationship. I&
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a coequal in a relationship with a client;2 2 by virtue of his special
skill or status, the fiduciary is a more powerful figure in the
relationship.23 This asymmetry in power requires the trusted
professional to act with utmost care and good faith.24
In a landmark case, Roy v. Hartogs,25 the court explicitly found
that a psychotherapist is a fiduciary to his client.26 A therapist's
sexual exploitation of his client is one of the most outrageous
breaches of fiduciary duty.2 Unfortunately, the nature of psycho-
therapy makes sexual contact both tempting and destructive.28
B. Client Dependence Engenders Client Vulnerability
The patient often enters a professional relationship with the
psychotherapist in a vulnerable emotional condition.2 The indi-
vidual seeks professional help because of painful, unresolved
problems, and she relies on the therapist's expertise to reduce
her suffering.30 In order to form a constructive alliance, the
22. See Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (1983)
(essence of fiduciary relationship is that parties do not deal on equal terms).
23. See id.; Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1985) ("fiduciary relationship
exists 'when confidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and
influence on the other' "); see also T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 153 (1982); infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. See
generally Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983) (discussing how fiduciary
relations may lead to an abuse of power); Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 69 (describing the trust and confidence inherent in a fiduciary relationship).
24. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988), in which the court stated:
[A] fiduciary is a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act
primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with the undertak-
ing. A fiduciary has a duty to deal "with utmost good faith and solely for
the benefit" of the beneficiary. A fiduciary's obligations to the beneficiary
include, among other things, a duty of loyalty, a duty to exercise reasonable
care and skill, and a duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries.
Id. at 284 (citations omitted).
25. 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975).
26. Id. at 352, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
27. See Feldman-Summers, Sexual Contact in Fiduciary Relationships, in SEXUAL Ex-
PLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 193, 197-203 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989) (case studies
illustrate that many clients feel powerlessness toward their therapists).
28. The intimacy of the treatment setting and the- phenomena of transference and
countertransference create forces that make sexual involvement tempting to both ther-
apist and patient. See infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
29. R. SnON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 289 (1987). This statement may not
be true for those who seek professional help to break a habit or to change a particular
behavior, such as smoking, or for those within the field of psychopharmacology. Never-
theless, the therapist in these conditions remains a fiduciary and must act with utmost
good faith and concern only for the patient's needs.
30. See Feldman-Summers, supra note 27, at 195-96.
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patient must trust the therapist enough to participate in treat-
ment with him. For effective therapy, in most situations the
patient must share her fears, wishes, conflicts, fantasies, and
feelings.3 ' The psychotherapist must assure confidentiality and
create a private, secure, and intimate process.3 2 The exchanges
between patient and therapist are not social discourse, and ideally
the therapist should orient them around the patient's therapeutic
issues.
The patient's self-revelation reinforces the power imbalance
between the parties, which some have likened to the relationship
between a benevolent parent and a child. Like a child depends
upon a parent, a patient often depends upon a therapist. At
times, this dependence becomes extreme. For example, the plain-
tiff in G'reenberg v. McCabeO testified that she became so depend-
ent on her therapist that he "became a God" to her and that she
would not question the therapy he prescribed because she so
feared displeasing him. s Experts have maintained that this be-
havior is attributable in part to the phenomenon of transference.36
C. The Phenomena of Transference and Countertransference
Recounting the details of one's personal life evokes a series of
typical reactions in a psychotherapy patient.3 7 Partly or wholly
31. See Marmor, Some Psychodynamic Aspects of the Seduction of Patients in Psycho-
therapy, 36 Am. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 319, 320 (1976).
32. Id.; see A. Stone, Commentary, Sexual Misconduct by Psychiatrists: The Ethical and
Clinical Dilemma of Confidentiality, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 195, 196 (1983) ("Confidentiality
has merited special consideration in psychiatry, not only because it is necessary to protect
the privacy of patients but also because an expectation of privacy is essential to protect
the process of psychotherapy itself, particularly the intimate process of psychoanalytic
therapy:'); M. Stone, Boundary Violations Between Therapist and Patient, 6 PSYCHIATRIC
ANNALS 670, 675-76 (1976) ("Once the patient has crossed the office threshold, she has
established herself as someone willing to expose the secrets of her life to a person
specially trained to hear and deal with them:').
33. See Feldman-Summers, supra note 27, at 200. The vulnerability accompanying either
low self-esteem or high dependency is compounded if the patient reveals these underlying
feelings to the fiduciary. The fiduciary who acquires such information is then in a position
to misuse or exploit these weaknesses of the trusting client. Enhanced vulnerability due
to revelation is virtually inevitable in the therapist-client situation because the client is
encouraged to "tell all:' Id.; see M. Stone, supra note 32, at 675.
34. 453 F. Supp. 765 (ED. Pa.), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
840 (1979).
35. Id. at 771.
36. Id.
37. See generally R. GREENSON, THE TECHNIQUE AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1345-
46 (1967). Gratitude at being listened to, feelings of support and protection, and a sense
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operating outside the patient's sphere of awareness, ideas and
feelings that are attributes of earlier relationships are "trans-
ferred" onto the relationship with the psychotherapist- hence
the term "transference. ' 8 The psychotherapist brings to the
therapeutic relationship a counterpart set of feelings, wishes, and
fears. Psychotherapists refer to this phenomenon as countertrans-
ference, and it arises in part from the therapist's own early
experiences and in part from his response to the patient's trans-
ference. 9
of personal importance to another individual arouse a constellation of feelings drawn
from past experiences. These memories, yearnings, wishes, and fears often reflect rela-
tionships with important figures from childhood, and their content recapitulates in the
present time childlike modes of relating. These modes of relating come to the fore and
layer onto the relationship with the therapist. Even though they are derived from the
past and may have nothing to do with the therapeutic interaction, they are present and
influential determinants of behavior. Dependent yearnings, strivings for childlike sensual
gratification, efforts to attain "special" status in the eyes of the therapist, strategies to
avoid abandonment and loss, and wishes to be loved are frequent, if not universal,
characteristics of the patient's contribution to the therapeutic relationship. Hateful or
destructive residues of early relationships also may be present.
38. Id. The court in Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), discussed
transference and the mishandling of transference:
Transference is the term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote
a patient's emotional reaction to a therapist and is "generally applied to the
projection of feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come
to represent some person from the patient's past." Transference "is perhaps
regarded as the most significant concept in psychoanalytical therapy, and
one of the most important discoveries of Freud."
Id. at 1364 (citations omitted). Dr. Laura Brown, the clinical psychologist who treated
Ms. Simmons, testified at trial:
What the notion of transference assumes is that as therapy develops, and if
therapy is working, the client comes to either consciously or unconsciously,
or both, regard the therapist as a child might regard the parent. This is
important because in order for a therapist to have positive powerful impact
in helping the client to change and heal, the therapist has to have the same
kind of authority power in a positive way with the client that the parents
once had, or the parental figures once had in a negative way with the client
while the client was growing up. And, so what happens when therapy is
working . . . is that this transference relationship grows so that the client
comes to experience the therapist as a powerful, benevolent parent figure.
And, what that means is that you've got a symbolic, sometimes conscious
sometimes not, parent-child relationship existing in the therapy setting, even
though you have two adults there.
Id. at 1364-65.
39. Stewart, Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, in 2 H. KAPLAN & B.
SADOCK, COMPREHENSIvE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1345-46 (4th ed. 1985). Stewart explains
that although Freud coined the term "countertransference," he wrote little about the
phenomenon. Id. at 1345. Stewart adds, "Just as the term 'transference' has often been
used to encompass the patient's total range of feelings for and against the analyst,
countertransference connotes a broad spectrum of reactions in the analyst. These reactions
1991] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT SEXUAL CONTACT
Transference and countertransference are a powerful admix-
ture. The paramount difference between the patient's and the
therapist's contributions to this interaction lies in their relative
awareness of it.4o Through education, training, and often personal
psychotherapy of his own, the qualified therapist is able to
monitor consciously and to assess the effect of countertransfer-
ence on his behavior. Indeed, he has the responsibility to do so. 41
The patient, however, may have little awareness of her own
transference. This differential in awareness and knowledge of the
transference/countertransference phenomenon is another facet of
the power asymmetry in the therapeutic relationship. The psy-
chotherapist has a special responsibility to use this power con-
structively.42
If properly managed, transference/countertransference inter-
action provides a focal point for the major task of psychother-
apy.43 Treatment becomes difficult when either the patient or the
may be regarded as analogues of the patient's transferences." Id. at 1346.
Therapists carry their own residual childhood wishes to be cared for and loved. Like
their patients, they wish to be valued and treated as special. They also bring their own
grievances and destructive impulses. In addition, just as patients respond to a therapist's
willingness to listen with acceptance, therapists are affected by their patients' idealiza-
tions, wishes for special closeness, and sensual yearnings.
40. See M. TANSEY & W. BURKE, UNDERSTANDING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE: FROM PROJEC-
TIVE IDENTIFICATION TO EMPATHY 133-50 (1989); D. WNNICOTT, Hate in the Countertrans-
ference, in THROUGH PAEDIATRICS TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF D.W.
WINNICOTT 194 (2d ed. 1974).
41. See Ginsberg, Diagnosis and Psychiatry: Examination of the Psychiatric Patient, in
2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 482 (4th ed. 1985) (noting the psychiatrist's
responsibility to be aware of countertransference behavior and explaining that, absent
sufficient understanding of his own motives, the psychiatrist may attribute "to the patient
feelings and attitudes that stem from experiences in the psychiatrist's life that do not
properly involve the patient").
42. See generally D. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS: MALPRACTICE IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHIATRY (1973).
43. Transference is crucial to the therapeutic process because the patient "'uncon-
sciously attributes to the psychiatrist or analyst those feelings which he may have
repressed towards his own parents. . . . [Ilt is through the creation, experiencing and
resolution of these feelings that [the patient] becomes well.'" L.L. v. Medical Protective
Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455, 459, 362 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting D. DAWIDOFF,
supra note 42, at 6). "'Inappropriate emotions, both hostile and loving, directed toward
the physician are recognized by the psychiatrist as constituting . . . the transference.
The psychiatrist looks for manifestations of the transference, and is prepared to handle
it as it develops.'" Id. (quoting Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of
Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 401, 401-02 (1957)). "'Understanding of transference forms a
basic part of the psychoanalytic technique.'" Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 755 n.1
(Mo. 1968) (quoting BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY i260 (2d ed. 1956)).
Transference is a rich source of information about the genesis of emotional conflicts
and behavior patterns that generally troubles the patient and leads her to seek treatment.
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therapist takes action based on transference or countertransfer-
ence.44 When a psychotherapist permits a patient to "act out"
transference wishes and feelings, he deprives her of the oppor-
tunity to explore them and to understand their significance in
the larger context of her life. Based on infantile ideas and
emotions, the patient's behavior is painful because it is false and
humiliating once its source is revealed. 45
Simmons v. United States41 addressed these issues in a legal
context. In Simmons, psychiatrists testified that the patient suf-
fered overwhelming guilt, shame, and anxiety because of her
sexual relationship with her therapist.47 The court discussed the
effects of transference:
The impacts of sexual involvement with one's counselor are
more severe than the impacts of merely "having an affair" for
two major reasons: first, because the client's attraction is based
on transference, the sexual contact is ordinarily akin to engag-
ing in sexual activity with a parent, and carries with it the
feelings of shame, guilt and anxiety experienced by incest
victims. Second, the client-is usually suffering from all or some
of the psychological problems that brought him or her into
therapy to begin with. As a result, the client is especially
vulnerable to the added stress created by the feelings of shame,
guilt and anxiety produced by the incestuous nature of the
relationship, and by the sense of betrayal that is felt when the
client eventually learns that she is not "special" as she had
been led to believe, and that her trust has been violated. s
Confusion about appropriate boundaries between the patient
and therapist inevitably results when therapists "act out" trans-
ference/countertransference feelings. Such boundary violations
The clinician's ability to be aware of his countertransference as a reaction to the patient
enables his understanding of the nature of the patient's transference. See D. WMNiCoTT,
supra note 40, at 194, 203; Ginsberg, supra note 41, at 485. Empathetic response to
transference communications reduces the demoralization of patients and enhances the
treatment alliance. See id. (explaining that the psychiatrist's contribution to the thera-
peutic alliance with the patient "is determined by his professional behavior and personal
attitudes, including sensitivity, tolerance, and the ability to respect the patient's rights
and integrity"); Stewart, supra note 39, at 1346.
44. See R. GREENSON, supra note 37, at 1345-46; M. TANSEY & W. BURKE, supra note
40, at 39-64.
45. See Freud, Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis: Observa-
tions on Transference-Love, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS 377 (J. Riviere trans. 1959).
46. 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1367.
48. Id. (quoting district court opinion).
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are unilateral alterations of the treatment contract and are almost
always done without the informed consent of the patient, who
may have little awareness of the significance or consequences of
what is happening.49 When the acting out is of a sexual nature,
the problems for which the patient originally sought counseling
may be brushed aside and sexual issues emphasized.w
The therapist who acts out his countertransference rather than
objectively monitoring it loses a valuable source of information
about his patient. He violates an agreement that the therapeutic
relationship exists solely to serve the patient's needs. By stepping
out of his role, the therapist betrays the patient's trust and
fractures the structure of continuity and constancy essential to
accomplishing the therapeutic task.
D. Studies of Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact
The relationship between a therapist and a client is intimate
and may lead to intense emotional closeness.5' Listening intently
and caringly is seductive to both parties.52 The literature in the
field indicates that a majority of therapists have felt sexually
49. Generally, "boundaries" are the behavioral rules expected of people in a given role.
One authority has defined boundaries as "limits on behavior-rules for how people in
various roles ought to behave, and statements from each individual as to what kinds of
behaviors she can accept or tolerate without feeling violated." Disch, Sexual Abuse by
Psychotherapists, 14(8) SOJOURNER: THE WOMEN'S FORUM 20, 21 (1989). She contends that
clear boundaries in the therapy relationship allow a client to express herself with more
freedom and decrease the chances of becoming mired in an exploitative relationship.
Clear boundaries include sessions that occur at scheduled times, beginning and ending
as arranged; no interruptions ordinarily occurring during therapy hour; a clear fee
arrangement; set treatment goals, changed only through negotiation; focusing the therapy
session solely on the client; clarity by the therapist concerning his values and their
impact on the therapy; a definite contract concerning confidentiality; no sexual involve-
ment with patients or social contacts with the client, except when overlapping circles of
acquaintances demand it. If social contact occurs, the therapist should define the rules
of contact and closely monitor any effects. Id.
Disch contends that unclear boundaries lead to harmful boundary violations, including
sex, or to client inhibitions and distrust of the therapist. Both limit the effectiveness of
therapy. Id.
50. Luepker & Retsch-Bogart, Group Treatment for Clients who have been Sexually
Involved with their Psychotherapists, in MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S NEVER O.K.: PROFESSIONAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 40-42.
51. See R. SIMON, supra note 29, at 284-87.
52. "Further, the necessary intensity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to
activate sexual and other needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist,
while weakening the objectivity necessary for control." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
supra note 2, § 2, at 4.
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attracted to some of their clients.0 Studies by representatives
of psychological, psychiatrice, 5 and social work organizations 56
indicate that between four and thirteen percent of all therapists
actually engage in sexual contact with their clients.5 7 Further-
more, the studies reveal that a large number of offending ther-
apists repeatedly exploit their patients.58 This Section reviews
the studies evaluating the prevalence of sexual misconduct and
explores other data concerning repeat offenders and damages.
1. Psychologists
Researchers conducted three major surveys in the past decade
to determine the prevalence of psychologist-patient sexual con-
tact.59 In 1977, one study revealed that 12.1 percent of male
psychologists and 2.6 percent of female psychologists admitted
to sexual intimacies with their clients.60 A 1979 study yielded
similar results: twelve percent of the responding male psycholo-
gists and three percent of the responding female psychologists
admitted having had sexual contact with patients.6 1 The statistics
were similar almost a decade later, despite the American Psy-
chological Association's public education campaigns.62
53. See, e.g., Pope, Keith-Spiegel, & Tabachnick, Sexual Attraction to Clients: The Human
Therapist and the (Sometimes) Inhuman Training System, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 147, 151-
52 (1986) (950/ of the male psychologists responding to a national survey admitted feeling
sexual attraction toward their clients).
54. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
57. Feeling amorous toward a patient is a natural by-product of the countertransference
phenomenon. As long as the therapist deals constructively with these feelings, the feelings
may contribute to the process, and no harm will come from the attraction. Acting on
these feelings is exploitative, however, and usually harmful. See generally Kardener, Sex
and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1135 (1974) (discussing
the adverse effects of therapist as "parent surrogate" or as "caretaker").
Data is available concerning other groups, including clergy and marriage and family
counselors. For a complete review of the literature, see G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM,
supra note 1, at 11-64.
58. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
59. See Holroyd & Brodsky, Psychologists' Attitudes and Practices Regarding Erotic and
Nonerotic Physical Contact with their Patients, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 843 (1977); Pope,
Levenson, & Schover, Sexual Intimacy in Psychology Training: Results and Implications
of a National Survey, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 682, 686 (1979); Pope, Keith-Spiegel, &
Tabachnick, supra note 53, at 152.
60. See Holroyd & Brodsky, supra note 59, at 843-49.
61. See Pope, Levenson, & Schover, supra note 59, at 686.
62. See Pope, Keith-Spiegel, & Tabachnick, supra note 53, at 152 (nearly 10% of the
male psychologists and 2.5% of the female psychologists responding to a national survey
admitted sexual contact with clients).
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2. Psychiatrists
Researchers have conducted two significant studies concerning
psychiatrist sexual exploitation. The first was a random sampling
of male psychiatrists in Los Angeles in 1973.63 This study con-
cluded that ten percent of the local psychiatrists responding had
engaged in sexual contact with their clients.64 A nationwide study
in 1984 and 1985 found a similar incidence. 5 It reported that 7.1
percent of the male and 3.1 percent of the female psychiatrists
responding admitted to sexual involvement with patients.6 6 The
results of the studies of psychiatrists are therefore nearly iden-
tical to those of the studies of psychologists.
3. Social Workers
In 1985, a national survey of 1000 social workers found that
3.8 percent of the male social workers responding to the study
had erotic contact with clients during therapy or within three
months of termination.67 No female social workers reported en-
gaging in this conduct.6
Statistical data reveal that the percentage of social workers
who sexually exploit patients is substantially smaller than the
percentages of offending psychologists and psychiatrists.6 9 The
explanations for this disparity are twofold. First, nearly seventy-
five percent of all social workers are women,70 who, statistically,
are less likely than men to abuse clients sexually.71 Second,
63. See Kardener, Fuller, & Mensh, A Survey of Physicians' Attitudes and Practices
Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Contact with Patients, 130 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1077 (1973).
64. Id. at 1080.
65. Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein, & Localio, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact:
Results of a National Survey, I: Prevalence, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126 (1986) [hereinafter
Gartrell & Herman]. This study surveyed one-fifth of all psychiatrists under the age of
65, but the response rate was only 26%. Id. at 1127. Although the return rate was low,
the profile of the respondents was consistent with the profile of the professional population
in the American Medical Association Masterfile. Id. A significantly larger proportion of
board-certified psychiatrists answered the survey, however. Id.
66. Id. at 1128.
67. Gechtman, Sexual Contact Between Social Workers and Their Clients, in SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 27, 30 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 32.
70. Id. The percentage of women in the other two fields is nearly reversed. Id.
71. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text; see also Gechtman, supra note 67, at
32.
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eighty-nine percent of social workers are employed by agencies. 72
The closer supervision and more clearly delineated boundaries in
institutions lower the incidence of sexual exploitation of patients
by social workers.73
4. Reconciliation
Every study cited used similar methodology: researchers gath-
ered statistics through confidential surveys.7 4 Given the inherent
limitations of this method of data collection, it is important to
note that the occurrence of sexual abuse may be much higher
than these studies indicate. 5 Some have suggested that one in
five psychotherapists sexually exploits his patients.76 The Gartrell
study indicated that sixty-five percent of responding psychiatrists
had counseled at least one patient who had been sexually involved
with a prior therapist,77 yet only approximately ten percent of
72. Gechtman, supra note 67, at 33. Pope and Bouhoutsos reported that only 14% of
psychologist-patient sexual involvement occurs in an agency setting. K. POPE & J.
BOUHOUTSOS, SEXUAL INTIMACY BETWEEN THERAPISTS AND PATIENTS 152 (1986).
73. Gechtman, supra note 67, at 33. Comparison figures should not be interpreted to
mean that any professional group as a whole is more or less likely to abuse therapy
patients sexually. G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 60.
74. See Bouhoutsos, Holroyd, Lerman, Forer, & Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between
Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY RES. & PRAC. 185 (1983) [hereinafter
Bouhoutsos & Holroyd]; Gartrell & Herman, supra note 65, at 1126-28; Gechtman, supra
note 67, at 28; Holroyd & Brodsky, supra note 59, at 843; Kardener, Fuller, & Mensh,
supra note 63, at 1077; Pope, Levenson, & Schover, supra note 59, at 684. For a discussion
of the methodologies researchers used, see Comment, How Vagueness Can Ruin a Survey:
Comment on Pope, Tabachnick, and Keith-Spiegel and Reply to Koltko, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
845 (1989).
75. Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein, & Localio, Reporting Practices of Psychiatrists
Who Knew of Sexual Misconduct by Colleagues, 57(2) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 287, 292-93
(1987) [hereinafter Gartrell & Herman].
Our data further suggest that the prevalence of psychiatrist-patient sexual
contact might be substantially higher than earlier reports indicated. Respon-
dents in this survey indirectly knew of 1316 cases of psychiatric sexual
violations, yet acknowledged direct sexual contact with only 144 patients.
How can we account for this discrepancy between the number of directly
acknowledged patient contacts and the number of psychiatric violations
reported to respondents? Perhaps many psychiatrists who did not return
the questionnaire were offenders. It is also possible that a substantial number
of respondents falsely denied their sexual involvement with patients or under
reported the number of patients with whom they had been involved.
Id.
76. Moisan, Sins of the Secular Priesthood: Civil Liability for the Sexual Seduction of
Patients, 33 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 440, 444 (1986-87) (citing 1977 unpublished study
demonstrating that as many as 20% of psychiatrists and psychologists were intimate
with their patients).
77. Gartrell & Herman, supra note 75, at 289, 293.
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psychiatrists admitted to such conduct.78 The disparity in these
figures suggests that the group admitting to sexual contact
contains many repeat offenders, that those failing to respond to
the survey had a higher incidence of abuse than those who
responded, or that not all respondents were truthful.
5. Repeat Offenders
Given the disparity in the statistics between psychotherapists
who admit to exploiting their patients and psychotherapists who
have treated exploited clients, logic dictates that many therapists
abuse more than one patient. Indeed, three studies indicate that
many abusive therapists are repeat offenders. 79
Although many single offenders have encountered situational
difficulties that could have been alleviated through education,
supervision, personal therapy, or rehabilitation, multiple offen-
ders may have characterological defects that further therapy is
not likely to solve.8°
6. Patients
The victims of psychotherapist abuse have little in common
except that they are mostly women who are younger than their
abusers.8 l Gartrell found that eighty-eight percent of the patients
exploited were femalem whereas Bouhoutsos reported that ninety-
two percent were women.P The female victims varied widely in
78. Gartrefl & Herman, supra note 65, at 1126 (7.1% of male and 3.1/o of female
psychiatrists admitted to sexual contact with patients).
79. Holroyd and Brodsky found that 80% of those who sexually exploited their patients
admitted to engaging in erotic practices more than once. Hoiroyd & Brodsky, supra note
59, at 843-49. The Gartrell study of psychiatrists found that 20% of sexually abusive
therapists had sexual intimacies with two clients and 130/o were involved with more than
three patients. Gartrell & Herman, supra note 65, at 1128. One psychiatrist reported
sexual involvement with 12 clients. Id. Pope's study found that 86/o of those who became
sexually intimate with patients did so only once or twice. K. POPE & J. BOUHOUTSOS,
supra note 72, at 44. Ten percent of abusive therapists became sexually intimate with
their clients between 3 and 10 times. Id.
80. K. PoPE & J. BOUHOUTSo, supra note 72, at 44.
81. See, e.g., G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 23 (describing study's findings
that female victims of psychotherapist sexual exploitation were an average of sixteen
and a half years younger than their therapist).
82. Gartrell & Herman, supra note 65, at 1128.
83. Brodsky, Sex Between Patient and Therapist: Psychology's Data and Response, in
SExUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 19 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989) (quoting
Bouhoutsos & Horoyd, supra note 74); see also G. SCHOENER & J. MILOROM, supra note
1, at 95. The Minneapolis Walk-In Counseling Center has treated more than 1,500 victims.
Id. at iii. Most victims have been women, and male therapists have exploited over 800/0
of them. Id-
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occupation, socioeconomic status, and level of functioning.84
E. Damage Caused by Sexual Exploitation
Surveys and studies have documented the extensive damage
caused by therapists' sexual abuse.as Therapists who treated
sexually exploited patients reported that ninety percent of the
abused patients suffered negative consequences, including diffi-
culty resuming therapy, hospitalization, and suicide8 6 Counselors
at the Minnesota Walk-In Counseling Center found that abused
clients displayed common symptoms, including feelings of guilt
and shame, grief, rage, depression, loss of self-esteem, ambiva-
lence, confusion, fear, and massive distrust.S A study of fifteen
patients hospitalized at the Menninger Foundation after sexual
contact with psychotherapists concluded that subsequent treat-
ment was prolonged and of limited success, and the incidence of
suicide was markedly elevated.88 Pope has described a syndrome
consisting of ambivalence, guilt, emptiness and isolation, sexual
confusion, impaired ability to trust, identity and role reversal,
emotional lability or dyscontrol, suppressed rage, increased sui-
cidal risk, and cognitive dysfunction.8 9 In addition to these de-
scriptive syndromes, therapist-patient sex may produce a number
of formal diagnostic disorders.90 Therapist-patient sex may also
84. J. Wohlberg, The Psychology of Therapist Sexual Misconduct: A Victim's Perspec-
tive, Presentation at Boston Psychoanalytic Society (Feb. 10, 1990); see Schoener &
Hofstee-Milgrom, Helping Clients Who Have Been Sexually Abused by Therapists, in
INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE: A SOURCEBOOK 408 (P. Keller & S. Heyman eds. 1987).
85. See, e.g., Bouhoutsos & Holroyd, supra note 74, at 190-95 (questionnaire was sent
to all licensed psychologists in California); Gartrell & Herman, supra note 75, at 289 (87%
of respondents who treated sexually abused patients assessed sexual contact as always
harmful).
86. Bouhoutsos & Holroyd, supra note 74, at 190-91.
87. See G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 159; Luepker & Retsch-Bogart,
Group Treatment for Clients Who Have Been Sexually Involved with Their Psychotherapists,
in MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S NEVER O.K.: PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 35.
88. See Collins, Mebed, & Mortimer, Patient-Therapist Sex: Consequences for Subsequent
Treatment, 3 MCLEAN HosP. J. 24, 28 (1978).
89. See Pope, Therapist-Patient Sex Syndrome: A Guide for Attorneys and Subsequent
Therapists to Assessing Damage, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
39, 40-45 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989). One authority noted the similarity to the damage that
incest victims suffer. Gabbard, Introduction, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS xi (G. Gabbard ed. 1989). Both groups of victims often suffer shame, intense
guilt, a feeling of responsibility for the exploitation, isolation, poor self-esteem, suicidal
behavior, and denial, and both often face familial rejection and disbelief. Id.
90. The disorders include major depression (single episode or recurrent), dysthymia (a
less severe form of depression), generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress dis-
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exacerbate preexistent dissociative disorders and personality dis-
order symptoms.91
Psychotherapy ends when patient-therapist sex begins, thereby
depriving sexually exploited patients of the opportunity for con-
tinued consultation with their therapist. Long after the formal
termination of effective psychotherapy, many patients report
having imaginary conversations with former therapists in order
to assess their own feelings, to come to decisions, or to self-
evaluate important attitudes.9 2 This internal dialogue can be an
extremely valuable residual benefit of therapy and may endure
for years after the resolution of transference and the termination
of actual psychotherapy meetings.93 The ambivalence and rage
stemming from sexual exploitation destroys this dialogue. The
benevolent, internalized figure is no longer available for consul-
tation. Prior therapeutic work is often undone, and a patient's
ability to trust is destroyed. 94
F. Summary
Through the unique nature of the psychotherapist-patient re-
lationiship, the patient seeks to bring about personal change that
she cannot accomplish by herself. Patient and therapist form an
alliance for the exercise of power on the patient's behalf.95 Power-
ful forces of transference and countertransference create a ten-
order, somatoform, psychosomatic disorders, sexual disorders, sleep disorders, and ad-
justment disorders. See K. POPE & J. BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 72, at 63-66; G. ScHOENER
& J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 142-43, 166-68; Pope, supra note 89, at 40-45. See generally
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(3d ed. 1987) (containing a categorization and description of each diagnostic disorder).
91. See generally Helzer, Robins, & McEvoy, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the
General Population, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1630, 1632 (1987).
92. -Pfeffer, The Meaning of the Analyst after Analysis, 11 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC A.
229, 243 (1962).
93. Id. "The vividness of the representation and the use of the representation for the
purpose of continuing the therapeutic dialogue are significantly correlated with self-
perceived improvement." Geller, Cooley, & Hartley, Images of the Psychotherapist: A
Theoretical and Methodological Perspective, in 1 IMAGINATION, COGNITION, AND PERSONALITY
123 (1981).
94. Reactivation of transference wishes and feelings, accompanied by their distortion
of interpersonal relationships, is a common regressive phenomenon. The therapist leaves
the exploited patient in the miserable position of having her conflicts reactivated at a
time when she can neither effectively continue psychotherapy with her former therapist
nor trust anyone else to do the necessary psychological work. See Pope, Research and
Laws Regarding Therapist-Patient Sexual Involvement: Implications for Therapists, 40 AM.
J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 564, 566-67 (1986).
95. M. TANSEY & W. BURKE, supra note 40, at 4.
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dency to act out rather than resolve pathological forms of
relating.9 6 To counter this tendency, the effective functioning of
the therapeutic alliance depends upon careful maintenance of
treatment structure and boundaries. 97 Therapists who engage in
sexual activity with their patients breach these boundaries.98 This
activity renders psychotherapy ineffective and causes severe and
long lasting damage to patients.99
The remainder of this Article explores the issues surrounding
the legal prohibition of psychotherapist-patient sexual exploita-
tion. Because sex in the therapeutic relationship causes severe
damage, many therapists advocate criminalization of this behavior.
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT SEX
A. The Call for Criminalization
In 1975, Masters and Johnson addressed the American Psy-
chiatric Association concerning the prevalence of sexual exploi-
96. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 701 n.4 (Minn. 1990)
(quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNO-
TATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY S 2.1 (1985)) ("Further, the necessary
intensity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to activate sexual and other needs and
fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist, while weakening the objectivity
necessary for control.").
97. See generally Disch, supra note 49 (thorough discussion of boundaries).
98. See id. at 21.
99. See A. Stone, supra note 32, at 196 (a psychotherapist's misuse of his power for
the purpose of sexual favors often causes the same type of mental injury that incest
victims suffer); see also T. Gutheil, Insights: Patient-Therapist Sexual Relations: The
Search for Clarity in Complexity (1989) (unpublished manuscript). Gutheil notes:
In a comparable manner, the physician is involved in a "special" relationship
of trust in which deep confidences, intimacy of conversation and privacy are
shared, and close ties may develop. The physician who then sexually exploits
his patient may be considered to be taking unfair advantage of the special
properties of the relationship. The literature clearly portrays the emotional
harm this causes, both acutely to the patient and to the process of future
therapy.
Id. at 4-5; see also Dagish, Many Legal Pitfalls and Ethical Dilemmas Exist in Psychiatry,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Feb. 1989, at 8.
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has determined that, for psy-
chiatrists, sex with patients is never ethically acceptable. The underlying
principle is the undue influence that therapists may have over their patients.
The physician-patient relationship is supposed to be a fiduciary one, geared
entirely to the welfare of the patient . ...
Id.; see also Milgrom, Secondary Victims of Sexual Exploitation by Counselors and Ther-
apists: Some Observdtions, in G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 235-40 (secondary
victims of a psychotherapist's sexual exploitation include spouses, children, parents, and
siblings); K. POPE & J. BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 72, at 68 (the emotional distance created
by a patient's or therapist's sexual involvement also affects coworkers, employers,
roommates, and friends).
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tation by psychotherapists. 100 They were outraged by numerous
incidents of sexual exploitation and urged criminalization of this
behavior:
We feel that when sexual seduction of patients can be firmly
established by due legal process, regardless of whether the
seduction was initiated by the patient or the therapist, the
therapist should initially be sued for rape rather than malprac-
tice, i.e., the legal process should be criminal rather than civil.
Few psychotherapists would be willing to appear in court on
behalf of a colleague and testify that the sexually dysfunctional
patient's facility for decision making could be considered normally
objective when he or she accepts sexual submission after devel-
oping extreme emotional dependence on the therapist.101
Although supporters have widely hailed their moral umbrage,
this blanket recommendation has been extremely controversial
within legal and mental health circles.10 2 Making all therapist-
patient sexual contact a criminal offense regardless of consent is
a wide deviation from traditional notions of criminal rape.03
By presenting seven states' criminal statutes on psychothera-
pist-patient sexual exploitation, this Section examines the changes
in traditional criminal rape statutes and explores the modern.
trend toward criminalizing sexual abuse by therapists.
B. Evolution of Traditional Criminal Rape
Traditional criminal rape statutes are very narrow. At common
law, rape is "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a female without
her consent."'1 4 Rape prosecutions focus on the issue of consent,
and some courts require the victim's utmost resistance, unless
such resistance would have been futile, in order for a judge or
jury to find the perpetrator guilty. 0 5
Common law rape does include some situations in which a
physician engages in intercourse with a patient in unusual cases
of sexual exploitation. These cases have generally involved the
100. See Masters & Johnson, Principles of the New Sex Therapy, 133 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
548 (1976).
101. Id- at 553.
102. See Appelbaum, Statutes Regulating Patient-Therapist Sex, 41 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 15, 15-16 (1990); Coleman, Sex Between Psychiatrist and Former Patient: A
'Proposal for a "No Harm, No Foul" Rule, 41 OKLA. L. Ruv. 1, 20-22 (1988).
103. See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
104. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (6th ed. 1990).
105. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 48 Ill. 2d 91, 98, 268 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1971).
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administration of drugs to minimize resistance to the physician's
advances. 10 6 A most outrageous case concerned a doctor who used
electroconvulsive shock therapy, combined with medication, to
render his patients helpless while he sexually assaulted them. 10 7
The physician was convicted of rape and incarcerated. 108 In Eber-
hart v. State,19 the court ruled that intercourse with a patient
against her objections, albeit feeble, was rape."0 Additionally,
courts have upheld convictions in which the therapist committed
the act when the patient was unaware of the nature of the act."'
These cases share a common theme-lack of consent.
In cases in which a therapist or physician misleads his patient
into sexual contact under the guise of treatment, courts have not
uniformly applied traditional criminal rape doctrine. Although
some states forbid fraud as a means of gaining consent,12 some
courts have held that such a situation does not constitute rape,"3
reasoning that the patient had the ability to resist or consent if
the therapist did not use force." 4 Traditionally, rape has been
such a narrowly defined offense that it leaves unprotected many
victims of nonconsenting sexual relations and sexual contact." 5
C. Modern Trends
Modern understandings of rape issues recognize that some
forms of sexual contact offend public policy and should be pro-
106. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1966) (physician charged with rape of a patient after an alleged administration of drugs
to prevent resistance); People v. Middleton, 38 Ill. App. 3d 984, 350 N.E.2d 223 (1976)
(physician convicted of deviant sexual assault for oral copulation with a patient who was
under the influence of drugs).
107. A. Stone, The Legal Implications of Sexual Activity Between Psychiatrist and
Patient, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1138 (1976).
108. Id.
109. 134 Ind. 651, 34 N.E. 637 (1893).
110. Id. at 655, 34 N.E. at 638.
111. See State v. Ely, 114 Wash. 185, 194 P. 988 (1921) (physician convicted of raping
a woman during a physical examination while she was unconscious); Pomeroy v. State,
94 Ind. 96 (1883) (physician had intercourse with a woman afflicted with epileptic fits).
112. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
113. See Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 355, 365 (1872) (under the applicable rape
statute, if the defendant did not deceive the victim as to the nature of the act, it was
not rape even if he misrepresented the purpose or "medical value" of the act of
intercourse); State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765, 768-72 (1844) (defendant not guilty of rape when
he fraudulently led victim and her parents to believe that defendant and victim were
legally married); see also Regina v. Barrow, L.R. 1 C.C. 156, 11 Cox 191 (1868) (defendant
not guilty of rape when he impersonated woman's husband); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 757-58 (7th ed. 1967) (discussing conflicting results on
whether fraud vitiates consent).
114. Don Moran, 25 Mich. at 355.
115. See A. Stone, supra note 107, at 1138-39.
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hibited, regardless of victim consent.16 Statutory rape provisions
designed to protect children embody these concerns."7 Laws
protect other classes as well. As of 1986, thirty-seven states had
passed legislation criminalizing sexual acts with a person suffer-
ing from serious mental impairment." 8
1. Mental Defect-Mental Disability
Maine's sexual assault statute offers a typical example of these
statutes." 9 Derived from the Modern Penal Code, it prohibits
sexual intercourse or sexual acts with one who the actor knows
or, if reasonably apparent, should know is mentally disabled and
substantially incapable of understanding the nature of the act. 20
This statute protects the severely mentally ill or mentally re-
tarded from sexual abuse by their guardians, caretakers, or
others in a position to know of their handicap. 21 This narrow
exception to the traditional requirement of forced sexual contact
is based on the premise that certain classes of victims are unable
to give full consent due to lack of maturity or intelligence or
because of another disability.1'
On its face, the "mentally disabled" or "incapacitated" language
of these statutes appears broad enough to include therapist
exploitation. Courts, however, have applied these statutes to only
the most egregious of therapist-patient sexual situations.' 23 Aside
from the mentally retarded or institutionalized mental patients,
these statutory exceptions to common law do not cover the typical
case of therapist-patient sexual contact and, indeed, do not extend
any more protection to this class of victims than does traditional
criminal rape doctrine. 24 Nevertheless, a few states have passed
116. E.g., HEALTH SERVICES INVESTIGATION DIv., MICH. STATE DEP'T OF LICENSING &
REGULATION, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY THERAPISTS: CRIMINAL, CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES 12-13 (1986) [hereinafter MICHIGAN, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY THERAPISTS].
117. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE S 261.5 (West 1988).
118. MICHIGAN, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY THERAPISTS, supra note 116, at 13.
119. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 253(2)(C) (1986 & Supp. 1989); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
120. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(C).
121. See id.
122. See Note, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 100-02 (1988).
123. See, e.g., State v. Chabot, 478 A.2d 1136 (Me. 1984) (affirming conviction for gross
sexual misconduct for sexual relations with nursing home resident).
124. Consent may be a defense if the mental disability is not known or reasonably
apparent to the defendant. Thus, the protection afforded is very minimal. See, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 253(2)(C) (crime occurs only if mental disability is "reasonably
apparent or known to the actor" and the victim was "incapable of appraising the nature
of the contact").
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:645
statutes criminalizing sexual contact or assault by physicians in
the course of medical treatment.125
2. Sexual Assault During Medical Treatment
Five states have defined sexual contact or assault under the
guise of treatment as rape, thus filling a gap in common law rape
doctrine.126 Under each statute, physicians who engage in sexual
contact during medical treatment or examination are guilty of a
felony.12 In New Hampshire, it is a felony to engage in sexual
penetration with another person "[w]hen the actor engages in
the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner
or for purposes which are not medically recognized as ethical or
acceptable."28 Michigan's statute is virtually identical to the New
Hampshire prohibition.1 Colorado's and Wyoming's statutes sim-
ilarly prohibit sexual intrusion inconsistent with reasonable med-
ical practice. 30 These statutes have essentially criminalized the
125. See infra notes 12644, 156-66 and accompanying text.
126. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3403(h), -404(g) (1986); MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
750.520b(1)(f)(iv) (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 632-A:2(VII) (1986); R.I. GEN.
LAWS S 11-37-2(D) (Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. S 6-2-303(a)(vii) (1988). All five states have
replaced their traditional rape statutes, which required a female victim and a male
perpetrator, with gender-neutral sexual assault statutes.
127. See sources cited supra note 126.
128. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 632-A:2(VII).
129. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f)(iv), which provides:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or
she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the
following circumstances exists . ..[the actor causes personal injury to the
victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration. Force
or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the following circumstances
.. . [wihen the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of
the victim in a manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as
unethical or unacceptable.
130. See COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3403(h) ("(1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual
penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree
if . . . [t]he actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than bona
fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical
practices"); id. S 18-3-404(g) ("(1) Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual
contact commits sexual assault in the third degree if. . .[t]he actor engages in treatment
or examination of- a victim for other than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner
substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices"); see also WYO. STAT. § 6-2-
303(a)(vii).
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault
in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault
in the first degree ... [t]he actor inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or
examination of a victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent
with reasonable medical practices.
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failure to meet the standard required under civil malpractice
actions.181 All of these states require expert testimony.1 2
Rhode Island takes a slightly different approach'tm to this type
of statute. It makes sexual penetration a felony if the actor
"engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim
for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or stimulation. ' M
Sexual contact is a lesser included offense.135 This statute differs
in that it requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent at
the time of the alleged offense; 136 the practice that the medical
community generally follows is not determinative. Thus, this
statute may not require expert testimony to obtain a conviction. 13 7
Textually, none of these statutes covers the psychotherapist-
patient relationship, although a recent decision seems to indicate
that courts will apply similar statutes to psychotherapists as well
as physicians.m In State v. vonKlock,19 a New Hampshire court
held that New Hampshire's sexual assault statute is not limited
to physicians. 40 The court found that the defendant psychologist
had engaged in "medical practice" and committed aggravated
sexual assault while counseling his patient. 4' The court quoted
New Hampshire's definition of "medical practice": "Any person
shall be regarded as practicing medicine . . who shall diagnose,
operate on, prescribe for or otherwise treat any human ailment,
131. See infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (explaining civil standard of care).
By adopting the "reasonable medical practice" standard, these states seem to be allowing
the medical community's standard for professional behavior to determine criminal liability.
132. Cf. D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE S 22.4, at 424 (1987) (discussing the need
for expert testimony on the causation issue); M. ZAREMSKI & L. GOLDSTEIN, MEDICAL &
HOSPITAL NEGLIGENCE 5 24.09, at 22 (1990) ("Expert testimony is generally required to
establish the standard of care applicable to the conduct of the medical practitioner ....
The rationale . . . is that a jury . . . would find it difficult, without assistance, to
determine what constitutes reasonable practice in the health care community."). In civil
cases in which even a lay jury would find it obvious that conduct violated professional
standards, courts may not require expert testimony. See S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN,
AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 11:2, at 267-77 (1981) (using the example of
res ipsa loquitor in the medical malpractice area). A therapist's seduction of a patient
may be such a clear-cut violation. See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
9 8.12 (1990).
133. R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 11-37-2(D) (Supp. 1989).
134. Id.
135. Id. S 11-87-4(C).
136. Id. S 11-37-4(D).
137. See supra note 132.
138. See State v. vonKlock, 121 N.H. 697, 700-01, 433 A.2d 1299, 1302 (1981), rev'd on
other grounds, State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433, 503 A.2d 774 (1985).
139. 121 N.H. 697, 433 A.2d 1299.
140. Id. at 700-01, 433 A.2d at 1302.
141. Id.
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physical or mental."'42 Under this reasoning, the other four sta-
tutes also would include psychotherapists.'"
All of these statutes are similar to fraud statutes in that they
punish physicians for engaging in sexual contact or sexual pen-
etration under the guise of medical treatment.'4
3. Misrepresentation
At least two state statutes that may apply to the therapist-
patient setting make sexual contact a crime when the contact
results from misrepresentation.145 Alabama, for example, finds
one guilty of sexual misconduct if, "[b]eing a male, he engages in
sexual intercourse with a female without her consent . . . or
with her consent where consent was obtained by the use of any
fraud or artifice."'46 Although Alabama courts have not yet ap-
plied this statute to therapeutic deception, such conduct should
fall within its terms when a psychiatrist induces a patient to
have sex under the artifice of therapy.
A Michigan statute similarly criminalizes sexual intercourse
through misrepresentation, providing that one who medically
treats a female and represents to her that her health depends
upon her having sexual intercourse with a man who is not her
husband, and who thereby induces her to have intercourse, is
guilty of a felony. 47 This narrowly written statute seems to cover
only instances in which a doctor tells a patient that she can get
well by having intercourse with him or some other man who is
not the patient's husband. On its face, the statute appears gender-
biased and may be constitutionally suspect.148 Assuming it is
142. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 329:1 (1955)).
143. But see G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 547 (noting that a Michigan
court "specifically rejected" an application of the Michigan sexual assault statute to
"nonphysician psychologists") (citation omitted).
144. The phrase "under the guise of treatment" assumes deception on the part of the
health care professional. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 632-A:2(VII) (1986) (a felony
occurs when the sexual penetration is not medically recognized, ethical, or acceptable)
with ALA. CODE S 13A-6-65 (1982) (plaintiff establishes guilt when professional obtains
consent by any fraud or artifice).
For a general discussion of fraud as it relates to psychiatry, see J. SMITH, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: PSYCHIATRIC CARE S 8.20-8.23 (1986).
145. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.90 (West 1968).
146. ALA. CODE S 13A-665 (emphasis added).
147. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.90.
148. Sexual exploitation of male patients does occur, although statistics indicate that
a female therapist's abuse of a male patient is rare, as is a male therapist's abuse of a
male patient. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83. This evidence alone, however,
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constitutional, however, this type of statute may impose criminal
liability against offending therapists. These statutes thus vitiate
consent obtained fraudulently and once again make consent the
prosecution's focus.
4. Position of Authority
One may find a more sensitive legal approach in Wyoming,
whose statute establishes sexual assault when an actor in a
position of authority abuses his power and causes a victim to
submit sexually.149 Wyoming defines "position of authority" as
"that position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household
member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other person who,
by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence
over a person."' 5
The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld this statute in Scadden
v. State.'5 Scadden, a teacher and girls' volleyball coach, was
found guilty of sexual assault in the second degree under this
statute on the theory that he used his position of authority to
cause a seventeen-year-old student to submit to sexual inter-
course.'52 Scadden argued that the student consented.la The court
explained, however, that this statute obviated consent because
the defendant possessed authority over the victim.154 The court
noted that if society gives one person the right to exercise control
over another, the controlling person should not use that position
may not salvage the statute from such an attack. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
210-11 (1977) (to withstand constitutional challenge, classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives).
149. See Wyo. STAT. S 6-2-303(a)(vi) (1988).
150. Id. S 6-2-301(a)(iv).
151. 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).
152. Id. at 1039.
153. Id. at 1040.
154. The court in Scadden declared:
In the exercise of its governmental police power, the legislature has thrown
out the protecting arm of the law to guard those persons who are vulnerable
to the powers and influence of one in a position of authority. This legislative
act permits the State to show that the victim did not consent, by demon-
strating that the perpetrator occupied a position of authority over the victim
and used that position to impose his sexual will. The consensual status of
the conduct can be disproved by establishing the participants' relationship,
and the defendant's use of that relationship to compel the victim to succumb.
This statute is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, and is within the police
power of the state to enact laws for the general welfare of the people.
Id. at 1040-41.
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of power to exploit sexually those under his influence.55 Given
the similar power asymmetry between patient and therapist, a
sexually exploitative psychotherapist should fall within the ambit
of this statute so that the state may pursue him criminally.
5. Legislation Specifically Prohibiting Psychotherapist-Patient
Sexual Exploitation
Since 1983, legislators have advocated a new statutory scheme
whereby the government will prosecute psychotherapists for
sexually exploiting their clients.e The new statutes specifically
define psychotherapy, sexual contact, and the class of potential
defendants treated as psychotherapists. 157
Wisconsin first enacted a criminal statute making psychother-
apist-patient sexual exploitation a criminal offense in 1983, when
the state made sexual exploitation a misdemeanor. 158 Minnesota
passed the first felony statute 59 and was soon followed by the
155. Id. at 1042-43. In its argument, the State did not rely separately on Scadden's
position as a teacher, but only on his ability to exercise influence over the girl. Id. at
1042.
In construing the statute, the court explained the type of status an individual must
possess in order to have sufficient authority over another to vitiate consent. The court
stated:
One in a position of authority is a person who acquires that status by virtue
of society and its system of laws granting to him the right of control over
another. For example, society grants to a jailer power over his prisoner,
and, therefore, the jailer is in a position of authority over the prisoner.
Likewise, the teacher or coach is vested with power by a grant from society.
The legislature enacted the statute to prohibit persons in such positions of
authority from using those positions to cause any individual who might be
subject to authoritative power to submit to sexual acts.
Id. at 1042-43. The court concluded, "A person of ordinary sensibilities in [Scadden's]
position clearly should have known that his conduct was forbidden." Id. at 1043.
156. See infra notes 157-211 and accompanying text. Following the passage of Wiscon-
sin's misdemeanor statute, Minnesota conducted a comprehensive study of this area. See
TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY COUNSELORS AND THERAPISTS, MINN. DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, REPORT TO THE MINN. LEGISLATURE (1985) [hereinafter MINNESOTA, REPORT
OF TASK FORCE]. California and Massachusetts have also initiated task forces. See CALI-
FORNIA SENATE RULES COMM., REPORT OF THE SENATE TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOTHERAPIST
AND PATIENTS SEXUAL RELATIONS (1987) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE];
ACT ESTABLISHING HOUSE COM. ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY PHYSICIANS, THERAPISTS AND
OTHER HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS, Mass. H.R. 5437, 174th Leg., 2d Sess., 176 Gen.
Court (1989).
157. See sources cited supra note 156.
158. See Wis. STAT. S 940.22(2) (1983), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. S 940.22(2) (West
Supp. 1989).
159. See 1985 Minn. Laws ch. 297.
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legislatures of Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Colorado. 160
California 16' passed a criminal bill in September 1989, followed
by Maine 62 in October 1989 and Florida' in June 1990. Other
states have considered or are considering this type of criminal
sanction. 64 When drafting these statutes, legislators must care-
fully define the critical terms so as to cover adequately the types
of prohibited behavior 165 and to forestall attack under the void
for vagueness doctrine.' 66
(a) Psychotherapy
Minnesota defines "psychotherapy" as "the professional treat-
ment, assessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional illness,
symptom, or condition,"' 67 as do California6 and Florida.169 North
Dakota similarly defines "psychotherapy" as "the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol
or drug addiction."'10 Under Wisconsin law, psychotherapy in-
volves "the use of learning, conditioning methods and emotional
reactions in a professional relationship to assist persons to modify
feelings, attitudes and behaviors which are intellectually, socially
or emotionally maladjustive or ineffectual."'1' Colorado's lengthy
definition of "psychotherapy" provides that "[p]sychotherapy
means the treatment, diagnosis, or counseling in a professional
relationship to assist individuals or groups to alleviate mental
disorders, understand unconscious or conscious motivation, re-
solve emotional, relationship, or attitudinal conflicts, or modify
behaviors which interfere with effective emotional, social, or
intellectual functioning."'1 2 Each of these statutes should ade-
160. See 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 88, S 1;'1987 N.D. Laws ch. 169, 5 1; Wis. STAT. ANN. 5
940.22(2).
161. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 795, S 1.
162. 1989 Me. Laws ch. 401, pt. A, S 4.
163. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 90-70 (West).
164. For example, Pennsylvania has a bill pending concerning sexual exploitation. See
H.R. 151, 1989 Sess. (Pa. 1989). Massachusetts is in the task force process. See H.R. 976,
2d Sess., 176 Gen. Court, 1989.
165. For a discussion and comparison of the types of behavior these states proscribe,
see infra notes 216-49 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 192-209 and accompanying text (discussing void for vagueness
doctrine as applied to the acts prohibited).
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.341(18) (West 1987).
168. CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93 (West Supp. 1990).
169. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 90-70, § 1(4)(a) (West).
170. N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-06.1(1) (Supp. 1989).
171. Wis. STAT. ANN. 455.01(6) (West 1988).
172. COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3405.5(4)(c) (Supp. 1989).
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quately cover psychotherapists, whether licensed or unlicensed.
Maine's statute, however, is not as forthright. 173
Maine defines "mental health therapy" as "treatment modali-
ties intended to change behavior, emotions or attitudes.' 174 Maine's
definition, however, includes only therapy that "is based upon an
intimate relationship involving trust and dependency."' 7 5 The
state also must prove that a "substantial potential for vulnera-
bility and abuse" arises from the relationship. 76 Because the
state must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt,177
conviction of a psychotherapist is not likely to occur under this
statute. Proving trust and dependency beyond a reasonable doubt
will be very difficult, but establishing a potential for abuse and
vulnerability beyond the fact of abuse in a given case may be
impossible.
These varied definitions are similar in that they outline the
relationship that the statute protects, although Maine is the most
rigid in its requirements. Because no reported cases specifically
apply these definitions to a particular fact pattern, their worka-
bility is untested. The vague requirements that Maine imposes,
however, will likely render the statute unusable, if not unconsti-
tutional. 78
(b) Therapist
Although "psychotherapy" delineates the protected relation-
ships, each statute demarcates the class of defendants it intends
to reach through its definition of "therapist" or "psychotherapist."
Wisconsin categorizes as a therapist a "physician, psychologist,
social worker, nurse, chemical dependency counselor, member of
the clergy or other person, whether or not licensed by the state,
who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy."'1 9 Minne-
sota's definition of "therapist" adds to this list a marriage and
family therapist, as well as a mental health service provider.180
North Dakota specifically includes "psychiatrist" in its class of
173. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 253(2)(1) (Supp. 1990).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE S 341 (E. Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984).
178. Although this statute's imprecise wording raises constitutional concerns, such a
discussion exceeds the scope of this Article.
179. WIS. STAT. ANN. S 940.22(1}(i) (West Supp. 1989).
180. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.341(17) (West Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 32:645
1991] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT SEXUAL CONTACT 675
defendants. 181 Florida's provision includes licensed therapists, as
well as any person who provides psychotherapy. 182 Colorado de-
fines a "psychotherapist" as "any person who performs or pur-
ports to perform psychotherapy, whether or not such person is
licensed by the state."183 California's criminal statute includes in
its proscription against psychotherapist sexual exploitation "any
person holding himself or herself out to be a psychotherapist."'8
This language seems to broaden the class of criminal law defen-
dants to include persons unlicensed by the State, whereas Cali-
fornia's civil statute enumerates certain professionals in its
"psychotherapist" definition. 85
These statutes attempt to bridge the gaps often found in license
revocation and other administrative proceedings. 86 Each statute
includes not only licensed professionals but also clergy, unlicensed
therapists, and "quacks" who are otherwise not amenable to
board supervision.18' Only. Maine restricts the class of defendants
to those who hold themselves out to be psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists, or licensed social workers."88 Consequently, Maine exempts
most unlicensed therapists from its class of defendants. 89 The
181. N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20.06.1(2) (Supp. 1989).
182. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 90-70, S 1(4)(a) (West).
183. COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-405.5(4)(b) (Supp. 1990).
184. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729(a) (West Supp. 1990).
185. Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE SS 729(a), (c)(1) (criminal code) with CAL. Civ.
CODE § 43.93(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (civil provision). Unlike the criminal definition of
"psychotherapist," the civil definition includes "educational psychologist." See CAL. Civ.
CODE § 43.93(a)(2).
186. For a discussion of the weaknesses of administrative proceedings, see infra text
accompanying notes 543-47.
187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-405.5(4)(b) ("any person . . . whether or not such
person is licensed by the state") (emphasis added). The Colorado Business and Occupations
Code for Mental Health Professionals specifically excludes clergy from the statute's
operation. See id. S 12-43-215(1).
Any person engaged in the practice of religious ministry shall not be required
to comply with the provisions of this article; except that such person shall
not hold himself out to the public by any title incorporating the terms
"psychologist," "licensed clinical social worker," "clinical social worker,"
"LCSW," "licensed marriage and family therapist," "LMFT," "licensed pro-
fessional counselor," "certified school psychologist," or "CSP" unless that
person has been licensed pursuant to this article or certified as a certified
school psychologist.
Id. The criminal code applies to all psychotherapists, whether or not licensed by the
state pursuant to title 12: See id. S 18-3-1405.5(4)(b). The clergy will likely argue that they
are exempt from the criminal statute, but the criminal statute appears to be broader; it
includes any person who performs psychotherapy in the statutory class.
188. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(I) (Supp. 1990).
189. The legislature's oversight in this regard could lead to the anomalous result that
an offender whose license was revoked for sexual misconduct but who was not criminally
prosecuted might be shielded from prosecution for any further violations because he
would no longer be licensed.
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legislature's failure to include unlicensed therapists is a critical
shortcoming in Maine's statute, leaving the victims of unlicensed
therapists without any real recourse through the criminal process
or board proceedings. Civil actions also may be difficult to main-
tain.190
(c) Sexual Contact-Sexual Act
In an attempt to meet constitutional requirements of specific-
ity, the states define in a variety of ways the behavior that these
statutes prohibit. Five of the seven states prohibit touching for
the purpose of sexual arousal or other similar conduct. 9' Litigants
have attacked some of these statutes as void for vagueness. 92
To determine whether a statute is void for vagueness, a court
must examine "whether the statute forbids the doing of an act
in terms so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion." 93
North Dakota defines "sexual contact" as "any touching of the
sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of
arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires." 94 In State
v. Jenkins, ' 95 a North Dakota appellate court held that the trier
of fact may infer sexual or aggressive desires from the facts
surrounding the touching. 96 Wisconsin prohibits a similar range
of behavior, but defines "sexual contact" in more detail than does
North Dakota. 97 Even with the additional detail, however, Wis-
consin's provision has faced vagueness challenges. 98
190. Malpractice civil suits require proof of the standard of care in the profession. See
inf'ra notes 274-300 and accompanying text. This standard may be very difficult to prove
with regard to unlicensed therapists who, by definition, operate outside of the profession.
Id. Thus, the statute may exclude from civil liability the perpetrators who are the least
amenable to criminal accountability.
191. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 729(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990) ("for sexual gratification");
COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-401(4) (1986) (for "the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or
abuse"); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.341(11)(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990) ("with sexual or
aggressive intent"); N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-02(4) (1985) ("satisfying sexual or aggressive
desires"); WIs. STAT. ANN. S 940.225(5)(b) (West Supp. 1990) (for "sexually arousing or
gratifying the defendant"). But see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 251(1)(c) (1983 &
Supp. 1989) ("sexual act" more narrowly defined than "sexual contact").
192. See, e.g., People v. West, 724 P.2d 623, 627 (Colo. 1986); State v. Bicknese, 285
N.W.2d 684, 685 (Minn. 1979).
193. West, 724 P.2d at 626.
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(4).
195. 326 N.W.2d 67 (NJD. 1982).
196. Id. at 72.
197. See WIS. STAT. ANN. S 940.225(5)(b) (West Supp. 1990), which provides:
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Defendants have similarly challenged Colorado's provision on
vagueness grounds. In People v. West,1' the defendant argued
that Colorado's statutory definition of "sexual contact" was un-
constitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of
the Colorado and United States Constitutions. 20 Colorado defines
"6sexual contact" as
knowingly touching ... the victim's intimate parts by the
actor, or ... the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or...
knowingly touching . . . the clothing covering the immediate
area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual
contact can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes
of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.20 1
The defendant argued that the phrase. "can reasonably be con-
strued as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification,
or abuse" denied him the right to have the plaintiff prove that
element beyond a reasonable doubt.2 2 Nevertheless, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the definition and the trial court's
application of it because the trial court had instructed the jury
that the State had to prove this element beyond a reasonable
doubt. 0°3 The court suggested, however, that failure to so instruct
the jury might be fatal to the prosecution.2 4
The Supreme Court of Minnesota used the same reasoning in
two cases that upheld the constitutionality of a similar statutory
definition of "sexual contact. ' 20 5 Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota
legislature amended its definition, making the Minnesota statute
the most detailed in its definition of "sexual contact."26 The
"Sexual contact" means any intentional touching by the complainant or
defendant, either directly or through clothing by the use of any body part
or object, of the complainant's or defendant's intimate parts if that intentional
touching is either for the purpose of sexually degrading; or for the purpose
of sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying
the defendant or if the touching contains the elements of actual or attempted
battery under S 940.19(1).
198. See State v. Nye, 105 Wis. 2d 63, 312 N.W.2d 826 (1981).
199. 724 P.2d 623 (Colo. 1986).
200. Id. at 623-24.
201. CoLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-401(4) (1986).
202. West, 724 P.2d at 627.
203. Id- at 627-29.
204. See i& at 629.
205. State v. Tibbets, 281 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Minn. 1979); State v. Bicknese, 285 N.W.2d
684, 685-86 (Minn. 1979).
206. See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.341(11) (Supp. 1990), which defines sexual contact:
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deletion of the "reasonably construed" language from the intent
requirement seems to have corrected constitutional infirmities
without the need for a corrective instruction.207 For similar rea-
sons, California incorporates "sexual gratification" language into
its statute, prohibiting the touching of a patient's intimate parts
if such contact exceeds the scope of medical treatment or is for
sexual gratification. 208
The statutes of Maine and Florida differ from other statutes
in that they prohibit the specific sexual acts of intercourse,
fellatio, cunnilingus, and sodomy, rather than general contact for
sexual gratification. 2 9 Other types of sexual touching apparently
are not sexual acts, but may be punishable as "sexual contact,"210
which includes "any touching of the genitals or anus, directly or
through clothing, other than as would constitute a sexual act, for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the
purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact."2 11
(a) "Sexual contact," for the purposes of sections 609.343, subdivision 1,
clauses (a) to (f), and 609.345, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (e), and (h) to (k),
includes any of the following acts committed without the complainant's
consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense, and committed
with sexual or aggressive intent:
(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's intimate parts,
or
(ii) the touching by the complainant of the actor's, the complainant's, or
another's intimate parts effected by coercion or the use of a position of
authority, or by inducement if the complainant is under 13 years of age or
mentally impaired, or
(iii) the touching by another of the complainant's intimate parts effected by
coercion or the use of a position of authority, or
(iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the intimate parts.
(b) "Sexual contact," for the purposes of sections 609.343, subdivision 1,
clauses (g) and (h), and 609.345, subdivision 1, clauses (f) and (g), includes any
of the following acts committed with sexual or aggressive intent:
(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's intimate parts;
(ii) the touching by the complainant of the actor's, the complainant's, or
another's intimate parts;
(iii) the touching by another of the complainant's intimate parts; or
(iv) in any of the cases listed above, touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the intimate parts.
Id.
207. See id.
208. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE S 729(b)(2) (West 1990).
209. See 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 491.0112 S 1(4)(c) (tentative assignment) (West); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 251(11(C), 253(2)(I) (Supp. 1989).
210. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255.
211. Id. S 251(1)(D).
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(d) Statutes Compared
Of all the statutes passed to date, Minnesota's statute is the
most widely known.212 The Minnesota statute has influenced many
of the states that have proposed or enacted criminal laws on this
subject.213
In 1984, Minnesota appointed a task force to study the problem
of psychotherapist sexual exploitation.214 Following the task force's
proposals, 215 Minnesota established criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree when one engages in sexual penetration with an-
other and
(h) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a
patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual penetration oc-
curred during the psychotherapy session. Consent by the com-
plainant is not a defense;
(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a
patient or former patient of the psychotherapist and the patient
or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the psycho-
therapist; or
(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a
212. Minnesota published an extensive task force report making recommendations for
actions in cases involving sexual exploitation by psychotherapists. See MINNESOTA, REPORT
OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156. In addition, the coordinator of the task force, Barbara
Sanderson, edited an informative book, IT's NEVER O.K.: PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK. See
MINN. TASK FORCE: IT'S NEVER O.K.: PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1. This and
other task force publications have been widely distributed. See supra note 1. Minnesota
also has acquired comprehensive data on the victims of psychotherapist sexual abuse
because Minnesota is the home of the Walk-In Counseling Center, which has to date seen
more than 1,500 such victims. See G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, spra note 1, at 3-10; see
also supra note 206.
213. See, e.g., MICHIGAN, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY THERAPISTS, supra note 116, at 6
("As a result of the serious issues raised by the Minnesota Task Force report and the
increasing occurrence of therapist sexual misconduct allegations, the existence and ade-
quacy of available remedies under Michigan law were examined"); Letter from Senator
Diane E. Watson, Cal. 28th District, regarding the history and origin of the California
Task Force ("In 1983, I introduced to the Legislature a bill criminalizing sexual involve-
ment of psychotherapists with their patients.... ITihe measure was based on Wisconsin
and Minnesota statutes and equated this offense with rape:').
Gary Schoener, Executive Director of the Minnesota Walk-In Counseling Center, and
Barbara Sanderson, Coordinator of the Minnesota Task Force, gave a two-day presentation
in Boston, Massachusetts, on September 24-25, 1989, to the Massachusetts Special House
Committee on Physician and Therapist Sexual Misconduct. Bills resulting from the
Minnesota Task Force are now on file and pending before the legislature. See supra note
159.
214. Task Force on Sexual Exploitation by Psychotherapists Act ch. 631, 1984 Minn.
Laws 45.
215. MINNESOTA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156.
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patient or former patient and the sexual penetration occurred
by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the complainant
is not a defense; or
(k) the actor accomplishes the sexual penetration by means
of false representation that the penetration is for a bona fide
medical purpose by a health care professional. Consent by the
complainant is not a defense. 16
Sexual contact, in contrast with sexual penetration, is a lesser
offense that constitutes a felony in the fourth degree.217
This statute may extend indefinitely, provided that the former
patient can prove that she was emotionally dependent upon the
therapist at the time of sexual contact or that the sexual exploi-
tation occurred as a result of therapeutic deception.2 18 Its protec-
tion is greater than that provided by Minnesota's civil statute,
which limits the time in which a former patient may bring a civil
action to within two years of the sexual contact.2 9 North Dakota's
statute is the narrowest of the new statutes. It provides that
sexual contact will be 'criminally prosecuted only if the contact
occurred during a treatment session; the statute therefore ex-
cludes sexual exploitation occurring outside the therapy ses-
sion.220
Maine's statute is broader in scope because it protects the
victim as long as she is a patient or client of the psychotherapist,
rather than just during treatment sessions.2' The range of be-
havior that Maine's statute prohibits, however, is much narrower
than other statutes because the State can prosecute only licensed
psychotherapists222 and the statute prohibits only certain forms
of touching.223 In addition, Maine does not eliminate the consent
defense,224 and if the victim cannot prove beyond a reasonable
216. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.344(l)(h-j) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); id. S 609.344(l)(k)
(West Supp. 1990).
217. See id. S 609.345(h) (West Supp. 1990).
218. See id. S 609.345(1)(i)-(j).
219. See id. S 148A.01(3) (West 1989).
220. N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989). The statute provides that "[a]ny person
who is or who holds oneself out to be a therapist and who intentionally has sexual contact
. . . with a patient or client during any treatment, consultation, interview, or examination
is guilty of a class C felony. Consent by the complainant is not a defense under this
section." Id.
221. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 253(2)(I) (Supp. 1990).
222. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
224. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 253(2)(I) (consent not specifically excluded as a
defense).
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doubt that she was "dependent" and "vulnerable," the statute
mandates the defendant's acquittal.225
Florida's statute covers sexual contact of a psychotherapist's
client both in and out of the office.2  The range of prohibited
behavior is similar to that in Maine's statute.2 The class of persons
covered, however, is broader in that the covered class includes
any person who provides psychotherapy m Furthermore, consent
is not a defense to sexual contact.2 9 The statute also covers former
clients if the termination of the professional relationship was
primarily for the purpose of having sexual contact. °
Wisconsin and Colorado enacted the most liberal statutes. Wis-
consin's statute provides that
[a]ny person who is or who holds hinself or herself out to be a
therapist and who intentionally has sexual contact with a patient
or client during any ongoing therapist-patient or therapist-client
relationship, regardless of whether it occurs during any treat-
ment, consultation, interview or examination, is guilty of a Class
D felony.281
The statute states explicitly that consent is not an issue in any
prosecution under that subsection.p 2 The Wisconsin statute encom-
passes all sexual exploitation that occurs while a therapist-patient
relationship exists,2 regardless of the time of exploitation.2 The
statute therefore comports with the theory that the power asym-
metry and fiduciary responsibilities continue outside of therapy
while the relationship exists.s
Colorado adopts the theory behind the Wisconsin statute, in-
cluding the same protection as Wisconsin and specifically proscrib-
225. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 177. The victim may have a formidable
task in proving that she depended on the accused. See supra notes 174-77 and accompa-
nying text.
226. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 491.0112 5 1(1) (tentative assignment) (West).
227. Id. S 1(4)(c).
228. Id. 5 1(4)(a).
229. Id. S 1(3).
230. Id. § 1(1).
231. Wis. STAT. ANN. S 940.22(2) (West Supp. 1990).
232. Id.
233. See
234. See d.
235. See Gabbard & Pope, Sexual Intimaces After Termination: Clinical, Ethwal, &
Legal Aspects, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 115 (G. Gabbard
ed. 1989). When a relationship terminates is a factual issue that may be left to the
factfinder to decide.
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ing sexual assault by "therapeutic deception." The Colorado
statute states that a psychotherapist who has "sexual penetration"
with his client commits aggravated assault, a class four felony, if
"[t]he actor is a psychotherapist and the victim is a client of the
psychotherapist." The complainant's consent is not a defense.M
Colorado's law resembles the statutes of North Dakota and Wis-
consin in that it extends protection only to current patients of
psychotherapists -not to former patients.m
California's statute differs in kind from the felony statutes.
Specifically, California adopts a different approach to penalizing
offenders and treats former patients uniquely.4 This statute es-
tablishes sexual contact in a therapeutic relationship as a public
offense prosecutable by the district attorney even though the
provision is in the civil code.2 1 Sexual exploitation by a first
offender, however, is a misdemeanor.? 2 The state treats the second
and any subsequent violations as "wobblers" -that is, the state
may prosecute the offenses as either misdemeanors or felonies,
but the maximum penalty for a second offense is one year in
prison and a $5,000 fine.m
Its small penalties have hampered this statute's usefulness. A
victim may not want to subject herself to the rigors of the criminal
process if the court will impose only a misdemeanor penalty on
the guilty psychotherapist. This statute does offer protection to
the former patient if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the therapist terminated the relationship primarily for the
purpose of engaging in sexual acts.? 4 If, however, the psychother-
apist refers the patient to an independent and objective subsequent
therapist before engaging in sexual activity, the accused will not
incur criminal liability, even if termination was for sexual rea-
sons.? 5 Giving a psychotherapist freedom to exploit a client after
referring that client largely circumvents the statute's purpose.
Of the aforementioned states, only Minnesota, California, and
Florida offer protection to the former patient. Minnesota offers
236. See COLO. REv. STAT. S 18-3405.5 (Supp. 1990).
237. Id. S 18-3-405.5(1)(a)(I).
238. Id. 5 18-3-405.5(3).
239. See id. S 18-3-405.5(4)(a); N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT.
ANN. S 940.22(2) (West Supp. 1990).
240. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West 1990).
241. See id. S 729(b).
242. Id. S 729(b)(1).
243. Id. S 729(b)(2).
244. Id. S 729(a).
245. Id.
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the greatest protection, because no time restrictions exist and the
therapist cannot escape criminal liability by making a quick refer-
ral, as he can in California. 6 Neither California 7 nor FloridaZ8
imposes criminal penalties if the therapist does not terminate the
professional relationship primarily to engage in sexual contact.
North Dakota, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Maine do not prohibit
therapists from terminating therapy for the purpose of engaging
in sexual relations. 9
(e) Summary
Nearly all of the states that have passed criminal psychothera-
pist exploitation statutes have made psychotherapist sexual ex-
ploitation a felony. Likewise, five of the seven states recognized
that harm occurs short of penetration and defined the prohibited
behavior in such a way as to include contact besides intercourse.
Six states offer protection against exploitative unlicensed psy-
chotherapists, thus filling a void that other legal remedies cannot
reach. Perhaps most significantly, the states, with the exception
of Maine, have completely circumvented traditional rape doctrine
by excluding consent as a defense.
IV. CivIL ACTIONS AS A MEANS OF REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
A. Burgeoning Civil Actions
Plaintiffs bring most suits claiming sexual impropriety under
the civil law. Because it is more flexible than its criminal
counterpart, the civil law encompasses a wider range of abusive
246. Compare id. S 729 with MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.344(i), (j) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
In California, the mere referral of a patient by a third party to another therapist vitiates
any criminal act; the statute does not expressly require that the patient actually see
another therapist. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE: 5 729(a).
247. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 729(a).
248. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 491.0112 S 1(1) (tentative assignment) (West).
249. All four states make sexual contact with a patient or client a crime as long as
the professional relationship exists. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3401(4) (1986); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 2255 (Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-20-02(4) (1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN S 940.225(5)(b) (West Supp. 1990). There is, however, no criminal responsibility
if the professional relationship has ended. Therefore, criminal law does not prohibit sexual
contact with a former patient.
250. According to a Michigan study, patients reportedly filed civil suits totaling $4.7
million prior to 1981. MICHIGAN, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION By THERAPISTS, supra, note 116, at
30. In 1981, however, a jury awarded a verdict of $4.6 million in Walker v. Parzen,
discussed in 24 ATLA L. REP. 295 (1981).
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behavior.21 In the criminal system, the government must statu-
torily define each crime with great specificity in order to pass
constitutional muster, and the State must prove each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.2 52 By contrast, civil actions
can be defined statutorily or through the common law, and the
plaintiff's burden of proof is usually the lower preponderance of
the evidence standard.2 Most actions for therapist exploitation
are brought under the common law, although several states have
created a new cause of action for exploitation by therapists.25
B. Common Law Actions
No specific body of common law aimed at defining or curtailing
sexual abuse by psychotherapists presently exists; however, sev-
eral clearly defined areas of tort law may provide a remedy to
victims of sexual exploitation.2 These common law actions are
often available not only to the direct victim of the sexual act, but
also to indirect victims, including spouses and family members.2
Of these actions, common law battery is the only action available
solely to the direct victim of exploitation. The other actions-
malpractice and infliction of emotional distress-may be available
to third parties damaged by the exploitative behavior.27 This
Section discusses each of these causes of action.
1. Battery
The most readily applicable common law action against, sexual
contact is battery, which is intentional, offensive, and nonconsen-
sual touching.m The touching must be of such a nature that a
251. Statutes must and do specifically define criminal law and meet strict tests for
constitutionality. See People v. West, 724 P.2d 623, 626 (Colo. 1986). Civil law, however,
may be based on either statutes or the common law.
252. For a discussion, see State v. Jenkins, 326 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (N.D. 1982).
253. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS S 41, at 269 (5th ed. 1984).
254. See infra notes 262, 386-87 and accompanying text.
255. See infra text accompanying notes 258-384.
256. See infra notes 264-73, 354-66, 374-83 and accompanying text.
257. Although this Article does not deal with contract actions at length, plaintiffs may
also maintain them. See, e.g., Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (court awarded damages under a breach of contract theory to a
husband in the amount he paid for his wife's therapy; his wife committed suicide after
the defendant therapist's improper treatment of her, which included sexual overtures
and a promise to marry her).
Third parties also may bring other actions for sexual exploitation, including loss of
consortium. A thorough discussion of these other options is beyond the scope of this
Article.
258. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 9, at 39.
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reasonable member of society would find the contact offensive. 2s9
Plaintiffs rarely pursue this cause of action for therapist-patient
sexual contact because many malpractice insurers do not provide
insurance coverage for intentional acts, therefore depriving the
plaintiff of assured compensation or a deep pocket.20 o Nonetheless,
plaintiffs have argued this theory successfully.261 An action" for
battery is a simple, straightforward cause of action which is useful
when payment of judgment is not at issue.
2. Malpractice
Plaintiffs bring most cases of psychotherapist sexual exploitation
as malpractice actions.= Malpractice is the negligent treatment of
a patient.w A patient can bring a malpractice claim if she is a
direct victim of the touching, and, in some instances, a patient can
bring an action for a therapist's touching of someone else, including
a spouse.2 To state a cause of action for malpractice, . the plaintiff
must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
the defendant owed the patient a duty of care; (2) the therapist
breached this duty; (3) the patient was injured; and (4) the psy-
chotherapist's failure proximately caused the patient's injury.265
(a) Duty of Care
Whenever a professional relationship is established, the law
places a duty upon the professional to act with reasonable skill
and care toward the other party.26 Proof of the existence of a
259. Id. at 42.
260. See Simon, Sexual Misconduct of Therapists: A Cause for Civil and Criminal Action,
21 TRIAL 46, 50 (1985).
261. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Lieberman, 526 So. 2d 969 (Fla. Ct. App.) (the plaintiff
pursued a battery action against her physician in order to take advantage of the longer
statute of limitations for this action), cert. denied, 536 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1988); Rotenberry
v. Wilhoit, No. 78-1233-B (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1980) (court awarded a former prostitute $474,000
for injuries sustained when the therapist administered carbon dioxide to the plaintiff and
sexually assaulted her during a therapy session).
262. See D. LOUISELL & H. WmLLwAMs, supra note 132, at 17.A.23 ("The psychiatrist who
induces a patient to engage in sexual relations during the course of or under the guise
of psychiatric treatment is guilty of malpractice . . . ."); J. SBuTH, supra note 144, 5 9.02
("The cause of action patients most commonly pursue is suit alleging medical malpractice
for professional negligence.").
263. See J. SmTH, supra note 144, S 1.04.
264. See D. HARNEY, supra note 132, § 10.6, at 222; see also Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C.
App. 170, 176-78, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837-38 (court awarded patient damages in malpractice
action against therapist who had sex with patient's wife), rev. denied, 309 N.C. 192, 305
S.E.2d 734 (1983).
265. J. SLITH, supra note 144, §§ 1.04, 4.03; Moisan, supra note 76, at 448.
266. See J. LEE & B. LiNDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 25.08
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psychotherapist-patient relationship is sufficient to demonstrate
that the therapist owed a duty of care to the client.267 This duty
arises when the therapist accepts a patient for treatment 26 and
may continue for some period of time after the termination of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship. 269
On the other hand, the duty owed is not so clear in the case
of an indirect victim of sexual exploitation. Several courts have
suggested that a psychotherapist violates his duty of care by
engaging in sexual contact with the spouse, lover, or child of a
patient.270 In these cases, the duty of care again exists by virtue
of the therapeutic relationship. In Mazza v. Huffaker,271 for ex-
ample, the North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed a husband
to bring a malpractice action for the sexual exploitation of his
wife because the husband was a client of the therapist.272 The
court relied upon expert testimony stating that sexual relations
between a therapist and a patient's spouse "are not therapeutic
(1990) (physician has a duty to exercise degree of care that an average member of
profession would exercise); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 32, at 187 (courts
should hold a doctor treating a patient to the standard of "knowledge, skill and care
ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing").
267. J. SMITH, supra note 144, S 1.04 ("[T]he patient must provide evidence that a
doctor-patient relationship had been created. On the basis of the relationship a physician
is impliedly obligated to treat the patient in a nonnegligent manner."). For a discussion
of how the psychiatrist-patient relationship is formed, see id. SS 2.01-.05.
268. Moisan, supra note 76, at 448.
269. See Noto v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 292, 295-96, 537
N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), affjd, 160 A.D.2d 656, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990). The court stated that Noto had a cause of action against Dr. Vittorio for
having a sexual relationship with her after termination of therapy. Id. at 297, 537 N.Y.S.2d
at 448. The court took notice of the fact that both California and Minnesota had civil
statutes creating a cause of action for a former patient to sue her psychotherapist if the
psychotherapist had a sexual relationship with the former patient within two years of
the termination of therapy. Id. at 296, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 448. The court noted, "While no
similar statute has been enacted in New York to date, under the facts here, and taking
into consideration [the plaintiff's treating expert's] affidavit, the complaint can fairly be
viewed as analogous to a cause of action for medical malpractice based on the seduction
of a patient." Id.
270. See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 590-
91, 770 P.2d 278, 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102-03 (1989) (court upheld two mothers' claims
of negligent infliction of emotional distress against psychiatrist who undertook treatment
of both mothers and sons and who sexually molested boys during individual therapy
sessions); cf. Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810
(1988) (husband allowed to bring action based on psychiatrist's sexual relations with wife);
Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1986) (court vacated summary judgment and
remanded case for trial on issue of whether social worker breached duty of care by
becoming emotionally involved with patient's lesbian lover).
271. 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, rev. denied, 309 N.C. 192, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
272. Id. at 176-78, 300 S.E.2d at 837-39.
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[and] would do harm to the mental well-being of the patient."' 3
(b) Standard of Care
In most negligence cases, the standard of care is that of a
reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances
as the defendant.24 Industry custom usually provides some evi-
dence of the requisite duty of care. Failure to conform to that
standard is some evidence of negligence, although the failure
does not raise a conclusive presumption of negligence.25 In med-
ical malpractice cases, the industry standard is conclusive; the
standard of care is that exercised by an average member of the
profession. 76 Nevertheless, a question still exists as to whether
courts will hold all psychotherapists to the standard of care of
an average qualified therapist or whether the reasonable person
standard will apply.
Most courts confronted with the issue have chosen the medical
malpractice model. 7 In Omer v. Edgren28 the Washington Court
of Appeals outlined the standard of care to which a psychiatrist
is held:
As a medical specialist, a psychiatrist owes his patients the
same duty of care owed by other medical specialists, i.e., a
psychiatrist must exercise that degree of care that a reasonably
prudent psychiatrist would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances. Thus, the same general considerations which
apply to other physicians and specialists are applicable as well
to psychiatrists. 9
273. Id. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 838.
274. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 32, at 174..
275. Id. at 194-95.
276. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968); 3 C. KRAMER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE S 28.05 (1981); W. PROSSER &.W. KEETON, supra note 253, § 32, at
186-87.
277. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986); see J.
SMITH, supra note 144, 5 1.05; Note, Malpractice in Psychotherapy: Is There a Relevant
Standard of Care?, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251, 260-63 (1984-85); cf. D. HARNEY, supra
note 132, § 10.1 ("In determining the standard of care applicable to a psychiatrist, the
locality rule is usually disregarded, and a national standard applied.") (footnote omitted).
278. 38 Wash. App. 376, 685 P.2d 635 (1984).
279. Id. at 378, 685 P.2d at 636 (quoting 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW 5 34.21.50, at
482 (B. Lindahl rev. ed. 1983)). But cf. Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App. 104, 781 P.2d
383 (1989). In Erickson, the defendant argued that a finding of clerical malpractice would
require the court to establish a standard of care for pastoral counseling, which would
violate the Constitution by requiring the court to examine religious beliefs. Id. at 108,
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
To meet this standard, most plaintiffs allege the mishandling of
the transference/countertransference phenomenon. o Zipkin v.
Freeman,21 one of the earliest exploitation cases, is an excellent
example. Mrs. Zipkin accused Dr. Freeman, a psychiatrist, of
negligently mishandling the transference she felt toward him. 2
Mrs. Zipkin was referred to Dr. Freeman to treat her severe
diarrhea and headaches.m After two months of treatment, she
was no longer suffering from these problems and asked her
psychiatrist whether she needed to continue therapy.24 Dr. Free-
man persuaded her to continue.25
Mrs. Zipkin continued with counseling and eventually fell in
love with Dr. Freeman.25 The defendant began inviting her to
accompany him on social occasions and overnight trips and to
swim in the nude.2 8 He convinced Mrs. Zipkin to attempt to
divorce her husband, move into an apartment above him, invest
in a farm he bought, and even break into her husband's house
and steal his new suits.m Dr. Freeman controlled Mrs. Zipkin's
life.289
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Dr. Freeman "mis-
handle[d] the transference" that Mrs. Zipkin exhibited toward
him "over a long period of time."'291
As [Mrs. Zipkin's expert] explained, to take the relationship
outside the office into social relationships, "would allow the
781 P.2d at 386. The court stated:
[A] claim for breach of a confidential relationship is different from a claim
for clerical malpractice. Plaintiff's complaint alleged the existence and breach
of a confidential relationship; it did not allege the elements of malpractice.
Moreover, plaintiff's claim for outrageous conduct is not premised on the
mere fact that Christenson is a pastor, but on the fact that, because he was
plaintiffs pastor and counselor, a special relationship of trust and confidence
developed.
Id.
280. See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365-66 (listing cases finding mishandling of transference
to be malpractice). For a discussion of the transference/countertransference phenomenon,
see supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
281. 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968).
282. Id. at 756.
283. Id. at 755.
284. Id. at 756-57.
285. Id. at 757.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 758-59.
289. Id. at 755 (complaint alleged that she was injured as a "result of the control" Dr.
Freeman exercised over her).
290. Id. at 761.
291. Id.
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patient to develop all sorts of unusual ideas just around the
feelings that she has about the doctor," and that a psychiatrist
should no more take an overnight trip with a patient than
shoot her. . 292
The breach of this psychiatrist's duty was complete at the first
boundary violation.293 The court did not consider sexual contact
a prerequisite to recovery, although it was certainly present in
this case:294 "It is pretty clear from the medical evidence that
the damage would have been done to Mrs. Zipkin even if the
trips outside the state were carefully chaperoned, the swimming
done with suits on, and if there had been ballroom dancing instead
of sexual relations. ' '9
Because the major health care organizations have universally
condemned intimate sexual contact with a patient,296 proving a
breach of the duty of' care is generally not difficult once the
plaintiff proves that the abuse occurred.297 This proof is not so
easy, however, against unlicensed psychotherapists and those in
many of the more marginal types of therapies.9 8 Establishing a
professional standard for these groups may be impossible. For
this area of litigation, therefore, the better rule is that which
courts follow in negligence cases other than malpractice. If no
industry standard exists in nonmalpractice cases, then the stan-
dard remains that of a reasonably prudent person in like circum-
stances.9 9 A court might utilize this standard in psychotherapist
exploitation cases in which no professional standard exists.300
These same issues arise when a direct victim brings a claim for
292. Id.
293. Id. See supra note 49 for a discussion of boundary violations.
294. Zipkin, 436 S.W.2d at 761.
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
297. This statement is true because courts often look to the standards set by national
licensing associations as evidence of the duty. of care. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States,
732 F.2d 366, 368 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984) (Hippocratic oath indicative of medical profession's
concern about potential for abuse); see also supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
298. See, e.g., Martino v. Family Sqrv. Agency, 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 597, 445 N.E.2d 6,
9 (1982) (court dismissed malpractice action against social worker, stating that "[a]lthough
the conduct alleged here was clearly improper, determination of the propriety of conduct
of social workers and the relationship it might have to injury suffered by clients generally
would be most difficult to ascertain").
299. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, 5 32, at 174.
300. But of. Annotation, Nonverbal Therapy Injiry, 20 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D
439-40 (1979) (discussing necessity .of ascertaining particular school of therapy in order to
set relevant standard of care).
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negligent supervision or when an indirect victim, such as a
spouse, brings an action for malpractice.
(c) Damages
Before gaining compensation, the victim must prove that the
psychotherapist's exploitation caused her damage. Sexual exploi-
tation lawsuits have resulted in extremely large awards, princi-
pally because patients "often allege and prove that the sexual
relationship with the therapist resulted in the absence of neces-
sary treatment, which in turn led to the worsening of the patient's
condition."30'
The law entitles both primary and secondary victims of sexual
exploitation to monetary compensation for all damages suffered
as a result of the exploitation.3 12 Accordingly, plaintiffs are usually
entitled to a return of all monies paid for therapy with the
abusive therapist, as well as past and future treatment expenses
that the exploitation necessitated3 03 The law also may entitle
plaintiffs to recover for lost earning capacity, mental anguish,
and pain and suffering, and to receive punitive damages.3 4 Ad-
ditionally, a third party plaintiff, such as a spouse or child, may
claim damages for lost companionship, affection, and society.3 5
A plaintiff need not prove that the sexual exploitation was the
sole cause of her damages.3 11 If a client suffered from mental
illness that the pyschotherapist's conduct exacerbated, courts
301. S. TAUB, Psychiatric Malpractice in the 1980s: A Look at Some Areas of Concern,
in LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 97, 101 (1983).
302. See infra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Phelps v. MacIntyre, 397 Mass. 459, 461, 491 N.E.2d 1067, 1068-69 (1986)
(sums expended for additional treatment may be considered in damage award for a
personal injury case); Turcotte v. DeWitt, 333 Mass. 389, 392, 131 N.E.2d 195, 197 (1955)
("[Damages include] both the original debt or damage and whatever interest ought to be
added to make a just verdict."); Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 280, 52 N.E.2d 576,
577 (1943) ("The measure of damages is fair compensation for injuries sustained.").
304. See Lewis v. Springfield, 261 Mass. 183, 187-88, 158 N.E. 656, 657 (1927); Cantara
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 3 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 87-90, 323 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SS 433, 454 (1965).-
305. The highest court of Massachusetts recently decided an important case. In Pinheiro
v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association, 406 Mass. 288, 547 N.E.2d 49
(1989), the defendant's medical malpractice liability insurance policy contained a clause
limiting the total liability for claims brought because of injury or death of any one person.
Id. at 289, 547 N.E.2d at 50. The court construed this clause to allow a spouse or child
to bring a claim for consortium separate and distinct from the claim of the injured person.
Id. at 300, 547 N.E.2d at 55. Such claim will not be included in the limitation of liability
against the injured party. Id. at 294-95, 547 N.E.2d at 53; see also Spero & Jorgenson,
Consortium, 84-12 MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 71 (1983).
306. The eggshell skull rule makes defendants liable for damages suffered in excess of
those that were reasonably foreseeable. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
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will hold the therapist accountable for the aggravation of that
condition and the attendant consequences.30 7 If the defendant's
conduct combines with the previous illness or condition to create
a new or different pathology, courts will hold him liable for the
entire damage.30 8 This situation often occurs when a plaintiff
suffers from symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder.3 9 Stud-
ies indicate that certain types of mental disorders coupled with
a trauma will more likely result in symptoms of posttraumatic
stress disorder.3 10 A plaintiff's predisposition toward this type of
pathology, however, does not mitigate the defendant's responsi-
bility for the results of his actions.31'
Malpractice is the broadest of the common law actions and
encompasses more situations than any of the other remedies.3 12
The action is viable not only against the abuser himself, but also
perhaps against his employer or supervisor.313 The next Section
focuses on the potential actions that plaintiffs may bring against
employers, hospitals, or supervisors.
3. Employer Liability
Often, a plaintiff may maintain an independent action against
a therapist's employer or supervisor. Courts may hold an em-
ployer or supervisor liable under two theories: (1) respondeat
superior and (2) negligent supervision or employment. This Sec-
tion examines these theories in the context of the psychothera-
peutic profession.
(a) Respondeat Superior
Under a theory of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability,3 1 4
if an employee commits a civil wrong while acting within the
307. See id.
308. This is known as the eggshell skull plaintiff's rule. See J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, supra
note 266, S 6.06; M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD, & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES
IN TORT ACTIONS S 15.01 (1989);" W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 43, at 292;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 461.
309. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
310. See Helzer, Robins, & McEvoy, supra note 91, at 1633 ("There is a growing body
of evidence that personality and behavioral characteristics that antedate exposure to a
traumatic event influence a person's response to that event.").
311. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, 5 43, at 291-92.
312. For a discussion of the other possible common law actions, see supra text accom-
panying notes 258-61 (battery) and infra text accompanying notes 347-85 (intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
313. See infra notes 314-32 and accompanying text.
314. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he centrality
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scope of his employment, a court may hold the employer liable
even though the employer did nothing wrong.315 In order to
succeed, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was an em-
ployee of another and that the defendant was acting within the
scope of his employment when the exploitative behavior oc-
curred. 16
(1) Employer/Employee Relationship
Whether an employer/employee relationship exists turns on
how much control the hospital, supervising therapist, or clinic
maintains over the defendant's actions. If an individual or entity
has a right to control the conduct of an exploitative therapist,
that individual or entity is an employer.3 17 If, however, the ther-
apist is merely subject to the supervisor's control or direction
as to the result that the therapist should obtain, the therapist is
not an employee of the supervisor but an independent contractor,
and vicarious liability generally will not result.318
of transference to therapy renders it impossible to separate an abuse of transference
from the treatment itself. The district court correctly found that the abuse of transference
occurred within the scope of [the counselor's] employment."); Douglas v. Holyoke Mach.
Co., 233 Mass. 573, 576, 124 N.E. 478, 479 (1919) ("If the act of the servant is performed
in the course of doing his master's work, in carrying out the master's directions, or in
accomplishing his master's business, then the latter will be answerable whether the wrong
be merely negligent, or wanton and reckless."); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App. 104,
108-09, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (1989) ("An employee's act is within the scope of the employment
if it occurs substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the employment,
the employee is at least partially motivated by a purpose to serve the employer and the
act is of a kind which the employee was hired to perform."); Annotation, Liability of
Hospital or Clinic for Sexual Relationships with Patients by Staff Physicians, Psychologists,
and Other Healers, 45 A.L.R.4TH 289, 292-95 (1986).
315. See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
316. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text.
317. This test is the traditional means of establishing the employer/employee relation-
ship necessary to invoke respondeat superior. The employer need never exercise the
right of control, so long as it clearly exists. J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, supra note 266, S 7.04.
Some jurisdictions augment the right-to-control test by other considerations. Id.; see
Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 302-03, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280-81, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300,
302-03 (1979) (merging employer/employee relationship issues with traditional scope-of-
employment analysis); F. HARPER, F. JAMES, JR., & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.11
(2d ed. 1986) (listing various practical considerations the courts take into account in
deciding whether an employer/employee relationship exists); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 253, S 70, at 501 (listing factors traditionally considered in determining the
existence of a master/servant relationship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 220 (1958).
318. See F. HARPER, F. JAMES, JR., & 0. GRAY, supra note 317, S 26.11 ("employers
have been generally immune from vicarious liability for the acts of their independent
contractors since the early nineteenth century"); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
-253, § 71, at 509; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 2; see also Doe v. Samaritan
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(2) Scope of Employment
In general, "scope of employment" refers to those acts that
constitute the method of carrying out the objectives of employ-
ment, even if those methods are improper. 19 Two cases address-
ing an employer's vicarious liability allow for the possibility that
exploitative acts might fall within the scope of employment. 320 In
Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd. 321
the Minnesota Supreme Court noted trial testimony that "sexual
relations between a psychologist and a patient [were] a well-
known hazard and. . foreseeable and a risk of employment."3 2
Further, the facts in Marston demonstrated that the sexual
contact would not have occurred but for the psychologist's em-
ployment with the clinic. 3 The jury was to balance these facts,
Counseling Center, 791 P.2d 344, 347-49 (Alaska 1990). In Doe, the court discussed the
"motivation to serve" test found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1}(c) in
the context of a suit against the counseling center for the sexual acts of one of its
therapists. Doe, 791 P.2d at 347-48. The court explained that when sexual contact "arises
out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimate work activities, the
'motivation to serve' test will have been satisfied." Id. at 348. Because an employer does
not authorize an employee to commit a tort, the court construed RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 228(2) to mean "only that the act which leads to the tortious behavior cannot
be different in kind from acts the employee is authorized to perform in furtherance of
the employer's enterprise." Id. at 348 n.7; see also Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App.
3d 591, 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810 (1988) (allegations that psychiatrist was agent of
hospital stated cause of action against hospital); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App.
104, 109, 781 P.2d 383, 386-87 (1989) (allegations, if proven, show plaintiff was harmed by
acts performed within defendant's scope of employment).
319. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (master cannot
excuse himself when authorized act was improperly performed). Under respondeat su-
perior, an employer is liable for an employee's tort if the employee acted within the
scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 219. Disagreement exists over
what constitutes "scope of employment." Section 228 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY provides:
1. Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
a. it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
b. it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
c. it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and
d. if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not expectable by the master.
2. Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different
in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits,
or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. § 228.
320. Simmons, 805 F.2d 1363; Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurol-
ogy, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1982).
321. 329 N.W.2d 306.
322. Id. at 311 (remanding foreseeability of psychiatrist's action as a question of fact).
323. Id. For a complete discussion of vicarious liability in the employment relationship,
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along with the universal prohibition against therapists' sexual
contact with patients, to determine whether the sexual contact
was within the scope of employment. 24 In Simmons v. United
States3 25 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that an Indian health services counselor was acting within
the scope of his employment under the Federal Tort Claims Act
when he engaged the plaintiff in sexual intercourse.3 26
Other courts that have considered vicarious liability in sexual
abuse situations have held that this behavior is such a deviation
from acceptable practice that it cannot be the basis of respondeat
superior liability. For example, in Andrews v. United States,3
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that a physician's assistant caused a patient emotional distress
by seducing her.3 The court ruled, however, that because the
physician's assistant was not furthering his employer's business
by seducing the client, it could not hold the employer liable under
respondeat superior.32 Likewise, in Hoover v. University of Chi-
cago Hospitals,30 an Illinois court held that the actions of a
physician who allegedly sexually assaulted a patient he was
seeing in his office within the hospital did not subject the hospital
to vicarious liability because one could not regard the assault as
having occurred in the course of the physician's employment.3 1
Even those cases that have not allowed courts to base respondeat
superior liability on sexual exploitation, however, have allowed
patients to recover for supervisory negligence or negligent hiring
of the therapist.33 2
see Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 563 (1988). "An enterprise
'fully causes' the wrong of an employee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent
unemployment of the employee would reduce the probability of the wrong to zero." Id.
at 572. Sykes notes that "[t]he crucial variable in this analysis is the extent to which the
employment relation increases the probability of each wrong." Id.
324. Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311.
325. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
326. Id. at 1369.
327. 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984).
328. Id. at 370.
329. Id. The court held the employer liable under a negligent supervision theory. Id.
330. 51 Ill. App. 3d 263, 366 N.E.2d 925 (1977).
331. Id. at 266-67, 366 N.E.2d at 929.
332. See, e.g., Andrews, 732 F.2d at 366 (court did not impose liability based on
respondeat superior under South Carolina law for sexual misconduct of physician's
assistant, but allowed claim for supervisory negligence); Birkner v. Salt Lake County,
771 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989) (defendant's conduct outside scope of employment as a
matter of law, but employer may be liable for negligence in hiring and supervision even
when respondeat superior is inapplicable); Annotation, supra note 314, at 292-97.
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(b) Employer Negligence
Several courts have required that an employer of an abusive
therapist be negligent itself in order for liability to attach.m
More cases against an employer have prevailed on the grounds
of negligent supervision than on a respondeat superior theory.3
For a plaintiff to succeed with a claim of negligent supervision,
she must prove supervisory malpractice in the same manner that
she proves the negligent care of the abusive therapist.a
Generally, the injury suffered by virtue of the negligent su-
pervision or hiring of the exploitative therapist is indistinguish-
able from the injury that the substandard psychotherapy caused.
This fact does not alleviate the employer's responsibility and
may result in joint and several liability for the injury at issue.Ma
The tests for determining whether a court should impose joint
and several liability are concurrent negligence and inseparable
damages.m When the negligence of the therapist and his em-
ployer contribute to a single result, a court may charge each
with that entire result, even though the duties that each owes
333. An employer may be liable under the theory of negligent hiring, retention, or
supervision of an employee when the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable.
See, e.g., Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1053. This theory is based upon the employer's primary
responsibility, not vicarious liability. An employer may escape liability if it shows that
it used due care. See Todd v. Wernick, 334 Mass. 624, 626, 138 N.E.2d 124, 125 (1956)
("'[t]he owner . . .of a building who has used due care in selecting and agreeing with
an independent contractor to do lawful work, is not responsible to third persons for the
negligence of such contractor'" (citation omitted)); Rasimas v. Swan, 320 Mass. 60, 62, 67
N.E.2d 662, 663 (1946); see also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 286-87 (Colo. 1988)
(relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958), court stated that even though
defendant's acts did not create basis for holding diocese vicariously liable, diocese may
be directly liable for negligently supervising defendant); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.
App. 104, 108-10, 781 P.2d 383, 386-87 (1989) (court reversed summary judgment against
church on grounds that allegations, if proved, would allow reasonable jury to infer that
church created risk of harm to plaintiff by failure to supervise, investigate, remove, or
warn parishioners of pastoral counselor's abusive behavior); Does v. CompCare, Inc., 52
Wash. App. 688, 694, 763 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1988) (court may hold employer liable for acts
beyond scope of employment if employer had prior knowledge of employee's dangerous
tendencies).
334. See Annotation, supra note 314, at 291-92.
335. For a discussion of malpractice, see supra text accompanying notes 262-313.
336. See Andrews, 732 F.2d at 368, 370 (had supervisor timely intervened, damage
resulting would not have occurred). The supervisor's role is preventive in nature, designed
to prevent damage from occurring. The supervisor's failure to act in this capacity does
not change the nature of the damage-the injury to the patient is the same; however,
the supervisor's failure to act allows damage to occur. For a discussion of the injuries
caused by sexual exploitation, see supra text accompanying notes 85-94.
337. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 70, at 501-03.
338. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 433A (1965).
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are separate and their culpability may differ.3 9 Thus, in cases in
which the exploitative psychotherapist is without insurance, is
judgment-proof, or acted intentionally, a court will find a super-
visor or employer who is less culpable liable for the full amount
of the damages.40
(c) Summary
Respondeat superior may be a viable action for victims of
psychotherapist sexual abuse.341 At least two cases have upheld
verdicts against employers of abusive health care workers.342
Because, however, nearly every reputable psychotherapeutic or-
ganization disavows sexual contact, a plaintiff will face difficulty
in proving that the contact fell within the scope of the therapist's
employment.
Employer liability will more likely attach in cases in which an
employer is negligent in his or her hiring or supervising of the
exploitative therapist. 43 Through joint and several liability, a
court may hold an employer liable for the full damage caused by
an exploitative therapist as surely as it would under respondeat
superior344 Further, if a plaintiff brings an independent negli-
gence claim against an employer, insurance coverage will likely
be available, even if the abusive therapist's individual policy does
not cover his actions.m5 This additional claim allows a plaintiff to
prove both intentional acts, such as battery ind intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and negligent acts without fear of
an uncollectible judgment.346
339. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 70, at 501-03.
340. General principles of joint tortfeasor liability apply. For a discussion of these
principles, see id.
341. See supra notes 314-32 and accompanying text.
342. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986); Marston v. Min-
neapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurosurgery, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982).
343. See Annotation, supra note 314, at 291-92.
344. See supra notes 337-40 accompanying text.
345. Coverage will probably be available because the failure to supervise sounds in
malpractice. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 149 Ariz. 565, 567, 720 P.2d
540, 541 (1986) (tortious conduct took place in the course of and as an inseparable part
of professional services); Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 54041, 300 N.W.2d 627,
628-29 (essence of claim is doctor's departure from standards of medical practice); Zipkin
v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Mo. 1968) (mishandling of transference phenomenon
pertains directly to psychiatrist's professional services); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co.,
122 Wis. 2d 455, 459-60, 362 N.W.2d 174, 178-79 (Wis. App. 1984) (language of malpractice
policy covers malpractice both of commission and omission).
346. See Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d at 464, 362 N.W.2d at 179.
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4. Infliction of Emotional Distress
A cause of action for the infliction of emotional distress is a
relatively recent development in the common law, and the scope
of protection it affords varies significantly among jurisdictions.
With varying degrees of success, plaintiffs in sexual exploitation
cases often plead infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs may
plead two causes of action: (1) negligent infliction of emotional
.distress and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plain-
tiffs have used both extensively against abusive therapists.347
(a) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs in physician-patient sex cases often plead negligent
infliction of emotional distress.3 A cause of action for the neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress requires the same elements
of proof as a negligence tort action: the plaintiff must prove that
the actor owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the actor breached
the duty, and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's
injury.4 9 The emotional distress usually must manifest itself in
physical injury. s° This cause of action is available to both direct
and secondary victims of sexual exploitation.35 1
347. See, e.g., Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 591, 770
P.2d 278, 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1989) (sexual abuse of patient's child by her
psychotherapist stated cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress);
Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810 (1988) (therapist's
engaging in sexual relations with wife while engaged in marital counseling with husband
states claim for emotional distress); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 806 (Me. 1986)
(because of nature of psychotherapist-patient relationship, cause of action existed for
negligent infliction of emotional distress against therapist who engaged in sexual relations
with plaintiff); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App. 104, 108, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (1989)
(plaintiffs complaint stated cause of action against pastor for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
348. See, e.g., Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 583, 770 P.2d at 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
349. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 253, S 30, at 164-65.
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 436, 436A (1965). In "bystander" cases, plain-
tiffs who see another injured and are closely related to the injured person may recover
damages even though they themselves were not physically injured. See, e.g., Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21, 69 Cal.'Rptr. 72, 81 (1968) (applying a
foreseeability test). In addition, a recent California decision held that a plaintiff who was
neither physically injured nor closely related to the injured person was able to prevail
on a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Bollinger v. Palm Springs
Aerial Tramway, No. E006050 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 17, 1990). One court extended that
reasoning to medical malpractice injuries. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology
Ass'n, No. 177PA88-Wake (N.C. filed Aug. 29, 1990).
351. Bystander cases exemplify when a secondary victim of sexual abuse might recover
for infliction of emotional distress. For a discussion of the applicability of this tort to
both primary and secondary victims, see Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 592, 770 P.2d at 283,
257 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (1989) (Arguelles, J., concurring).
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Originally, negligent infliction of emotional distress was a by-
stander cause of action that allowed close relatives who had
witnessed negligent injury to a loved one to recover for the
emotional distress that the sight caused.3 52 In jurisdictions that
have omitted the physical injury requirement,3  the usefulness
of this cause of action to the direct victim in psychotherapist
sexual exploitation cases is questionable. This action offers no
real advantage over malpractice actions.
This action has great potential, however, as a remedial vehicle
for secondary victims of sexual exploitation. The negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress action has been successful in cases in
which the defendant undertook an affirmative duty to both the
plaintiff and the primary patient. For example, in Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.,3- a psychologist treated
two mothers and their minor sons.3 55 Under the guise of treat-
ment, the psychotherapist molested both boys at the clinic and
one of the boys outside the clinic.3 56 The California Supreme
Court allowed the mothers to bring an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress because the defendant therapist
owed them an affirmative duty of competent treatment.3 57 He
was aware of the familial relationship when he accepted the boys
and their mothers as patients, and his counseling was intended
to improve the family relationships. 35
In these circumstances, the therapist, as a professional psy-
chologist, clearly knew or should have known in each case that
his sexual molestation of the child would directly injure and
cause severe emotional distress to his other patient, the mother,
as well as to the parent-child relationship that was also under
his care. His abuse of the therapeutic relationship and moles-
tation of the boys breached his duty of care to the mothers as
well as to the children.359
352. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
353. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 593, 770 P.2d at 285, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (Arguelles,
J., concurring) (disposing of the physical injury requirement for negligent infliction of
emotional distress when the underlying conduct was extreme and outrageous) (citing
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952)).
354. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98.
355. Id. at 585, 770 P.2d at 279, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
356. Id. at 585-86, 770 P.2d at 279, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
357. Id. at 590-91, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
358. Id. at 590, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
359. Id. at 591, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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Even if the defendant owed no duty to the party with whom
he had sexual relations, a therapist may be liable for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to one to whom he does owe a
duty. For example, in Richard H. v. Larry D.,360 the plaintiff's
allegation of a therapist's sexual relationship with the plaintiff's
wife was sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.3 61 The California Court of Appeals
stated, "It is readily foreseeable that a patient seeing a psychi-
atrist for purposes of stabilizing and improving his or her mar-
riage would feel betrayed and suffer emotional distress upon
learning that the psychiatrist has, during the course of the
patient's treatment, been engaging in sexual relations with the
patient's spouse. '36 2
Rowe v. Bennettm also recognized negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress in an analogous situation.36 In Rowe, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine held that a patient stated a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress based on a social work-
er's involvement with the patient's live-in lesbian companion.36 5
Thus, negligent infliction of emotional distress generally offers
a broader scope of protection for indirect victims of abuse than
does malpractice. 6 The same may be true with respect to inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
(b) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress was first recognized in the California case of State
Rubbish Collectors Association v. Siliznoff.36 7 The following ele-
ments are necessary to establish a prima facie case: (1) the
defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard for the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered extreme
360. 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988).
361. Id. at 595, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
362. Id. at 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
363. 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 1986).
364. Id. at 807.
365. Id. at 806.
366. Negligent infliction of emotional distress differs from and may be broader than
malpractice, as secondary victims need not have experienced the sexual abuse themselves.
See supra notes 354-65. The cause of action may also be broader in that it may not
require victims to prove that the act fell beneath the standard of care for the psycho-
therapist profession, but rather just that the act inflicted emotional distress.
367. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
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emotional distress; and (3) the defendant's actions proximately
caused the emotional distress.36 As in negligent infliction of
emotional distress, many states have abolished the requirement
that a plaintiff suffer physical injury resulting from the defen-
dant's conduct. 8 9 Courts, however, may require physical presence
at the place of outrageous conduct.370 This presence requirement
may limit intentional infliction claims to direct victims.
Destefano v. Grabrians71 provides an example of a direct victim's
utilization of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
Destefano, the plaintiffs brought an action against a priest for
engaging in sexual relations with the wife during marriage coun-
seling. 72 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the wife's
allegations stated a claim for severe emotional distress.3s1
If courts modify the presence requirement, a wider range of
plaintiffs will recover for emotional distress. Some authorities
suggest that the requirement may be obviated, at least in some
situations.374 Prosser and Keeton noted that "[t]he Caveat is
intended . . . to leave open the possibility of situations in which
presence at the time may not be required."3 75 Such situations
may include actions against a defendant by those standing in
close proximity to the victim or by those whom the defendant's
conduct would foreseeably distress. At least two courts have
considered eliminating the presence requirement in sexual abuse
cases.3 7
368. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 46(1) (1965).
369. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983).
370. See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 598,
770 P.2d 278, 287-88, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 107-08 (1989) (Arguelles, J., concurring); Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968); Nancy P.
v. D'Amato, 401 Mass. 516, 521, 517 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1988).
371. 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
372. Id. at 278.
373. Id. at 286; see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App. 104, 781 P.2d 383 (1989). In
Erickson, the court found that the complaint stated a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 108, 781 P.2d at 386. The court stated:
[Blecause plaintiff has alleged a confidential relationship, proof of her other
allegations would permit the jury to infer that Christenson's actions exceeded
the limits of social toleration, that they were done with the knowledge that
they would cause her grave distress and that they in fact caused her severe
emotional distress. That is sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
Id.
374. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT S 46 comment 1 (1965).
375. Id.
376. See infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts briefly consid-
ered relaxing the presence requirement in Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 77
in which the court noted that "[a] custodial parent of a young
child sexually abused by a trusted adult neighbor might present
a particularly appealing case for not imposing a presence require-
ment."3 8  In Delia S. v. Torres,179 the California Court of Appeals
dropped the presence requirement and allowed a husband to
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress after his
friend raped his wife.s0 "[T]he wrong for which recovery was
sought was personal to [the husband] . . . . [I]t is his relationship
to the object of the act and the effect of the transgression on
him personally which gives rise to the cause of action."'' l
Although neither of these cases dealt with sexual exploitation
by a therapist, the therapist's position of trust and therapy's
closed, confidential setting are sound reasons for an exception to
the presence requirement. In his concurring opinion in Marlene
F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.,3 2 Justice Ar-
guelles argued for a finding of intentional infliction of emotional
distress: "In brief, I believe that what we have before us is a
case of outrageous conduct, atrocious and offensive acts commit-
ted within a relationship of trust, that might permit the imposi-
tion of liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
in addition to the other theories available." ''  Applying the claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress to exploitative psy-
chotherapists thus opens up whole new vistas for secondary
victims of sexual exploitation. Although the law has not yet
settled firmly on the elements the plaintiff must prove or on the
parameters of the action's scope, intentional infliction of emotional
distress appears well suited to the needs of secondary victims.
(c) Summary
Both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims are evolving areas of the law. Unfortunately, no general
rules of application exist at this time. The proof requirements
and outcomes vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, though a
377. 401 Mass. 516, 517 N.E.2d"24 (1988).
378. Id. at 522, 517 N.E.2d at 828.
379. 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982).
380. Id. at 484, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
381. Id.
382. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
383. Id. at 592, 770 P.2d at 283-84, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (Arguelles, J., concurring).
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trend may be developing away from the traditional presence and
physical injury requirements which would make the action lucra-
tive for plaintiffs.& A few states, however, have attempted to
set aside common law uncertainties entirely in favor of statutes
that more clearly define the prohibited behavior and the plaintiffs
remedies.8 5
C. Statutory Civil Actions
The states are beginning to enact civil causes of action that
benefit victims in response to the problem of psychotherapeutic
exploitation. Minnesota and Wisconsin took the lead in 1986.36
The Minnesota statute was essentially duplicated by California
in 1987 and Illinois in 1989.387
1. Purpose
Although one may now bring an action for therapist exploita-
tion under the common law in all states, the results in similar
cases vary dramatically. Civil statutes make sexual exploitation
of a patient negligence per se and create an irrebuttable pre-
sumption as to the therapist's duty of care.3 8 Minnesota and
Illinois have enacted substantively identical actions, which state:
A cause of action against a psychotherapist for sexual exploi-
tation exists for a patient or former patient for injury caused
by sexual contact with the psychotherapist, if the sexual con-
tact occurred:
(1) during the period the patient was receiving psychotherapy
from the psychotherapist; or
(2) after the period the patient received psychotherapy from
the psychotherapist if (a) the former patient was emotionally
dependent on the psychotherapist; or (b) the sexual contact
occurred by means of therapeutic deception.
The patient or former patient may recover damages from a
384. For a detailed discussion, see id. at 588-91, 770 P.2d at 285-87, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
101-03. See also supra notes 374-83 and accompanying text.
385. See CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93(b) (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802
(Smith-Hurd 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.02 (West 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 895.70(2)
(West Supp. 1989).
386. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.02; WIS. STAT. ANN. S 895.70(2).
387. See CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93(b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802.
388. See infra notes 389-96 and accompanying text.
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psychotherapist who is found liable for sexual exploitation. It
is not a defense to the action that sexual contact with a patient
occurred outside a therapy or treatment session or that it
occurred off the premises regularly used by the psychothera-
pist for therapy or treatment sessions.e 9
California's statute differs in the scope of its coverage and in
its approach to former patients by eliminating the requirement
of emotional dependency or therapeutic deception. 390 The Wiscon-
sin statute differs greatly from the three statutes discussed
above. It provides:
Any person who suffers, directly or indirectly, a physical,
mental or emotional injury caused by, resulting from or arising
out of sexual contact with a therapist who is rendering or has
rendered to that person psychotherapy, counseling or other
assessment or treatment of or involving any mental or emo-
tional illness, symptom or condition has a civil cause of action
against the psychotherapist for all damages resulting from,
arising out of or caused by that sexual contact.391
Wisconsin, like California, does not require a showing of emotional
dependency.3 92 Wisconsin specifically allows for emotional inju-
ries. 393 In addition, its statute provides for recovery of all damages
resulting from or arising out of sexual contact. 94 If the defen-
dant's actions aggravated a preexisting condition, a court may
assess all damages against the abusing psychotherapist.
Although they take different approaches, all four states have
established the wrongfulness of sexual contact in psychothera-
peutic relationships.3 95 This statutory prohibition lessens the
plaintiffs burden. For liability to attach, she need prove only
that sexual contact occurred and caused her damage. This type
of statute is an improvement over the common law because it
creates clarity and uniformity by prohibiting sexual relations in
a therapeutic setting. Under common law, a plaintiff must still
prove with expert testimony the proper standard of care and
that the defendant's action fell below it.396
389. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.02; see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802.
390. See infra text accompanying notes 400, 415-18.
391. WIs. STAT. ANN. S 895.70(2) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See id.
395. See supra notes 388-94 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 274-300 and accompanying text.
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2. Scope of Coverage
The definitions of these statutes set their parameters. The
definitions of "psychotherapist" and "psychotherapy" delineate
the restricted class of defendants, and the definition of "sexual
contact" describes the prohibited behavior.7 The definition of
"patient" is important because it describes the class of persons
that the statute protects. 38
(a) Class of Defendants
The statutes of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois define "psy-
chotherapist" broadly to cover nearly all counselors, both licensed
and unlicensed.39 9 California is much more restrictive. Its statute
specifies only certain groups for coverage and does not include
unlicensed counselors and other therapists. 410
Broad definitions of "psychotherapist" vastly enlarge the class
of potential defendants. Otherwise, a plaintiff would encounter
great difficulty in establishing a duty of care for clergy malprac-
tice or "New Age" counseling. 4°1 The Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Illinois statutes hold unlicensed therapists, otherwise unaccount-
able to licensing or other disciplinary procedure, responsible in
the same way as a licensed, board-certified therapist.40 2 Statuto-
rily broadening the class of defendants to include unlicensed
psychotherapists effectively eliminates many common law loop-
holes.
(b) "Psychotherapy" Defined
The definition of "psychotherapy" in Minnesota and California
states, "'Psychotherapy' means the professional treatment, as-
sessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom,
or condition. '403 Illinois' definition is more restrictive. The Illinois
397. See infra notes 399-413 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., infra notes 414-26 and accompanying text.
399. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 801(1)(d) (Smith-Hurd 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5
148A.01(5) (West 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 895.70(1)(e) (West Supp. 1989).
400. CAL. Civ. CODE S 43.93(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
401. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 399. These statutes set a minimum standard of behavior for all
therapists, whether licensed or unlicensed. For a discussion of the purposes behind
criminalizing behaviors, see W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 113, at 4. For a
discussion of the advantages and limitations of licensing procedures, see infra notes 470-
548 and accompanying text.
403. CAL. CIv. CODE S 43.93(a)(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.01(6).
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statute specifically excludes counseling of a religious or spiritual
nature and social work.4 4 It also specifically excludes a family
member or friend's casual advice.40 5 The Wisconsin statute defines
"psychotherapy" by describing treatment methods and goals and
is therefore somewhat narrower than the others, but no signifi-
cant difference in application should exist.46 No one has chal-
lenged any of these definitions, and all appear sufficiently broad
to include nearly all, if not all, types of counselors. Illinois'
exclusion of clergy, however, has limits and confuses the scope
of this definition, especially when a clergyman is fulfilling dual
roles for profit.
(c) Prohibited Behavior
Unfortunately, all of the statutes have borrowed or adopted
the criminal law's definitions of "sexual contact." California and
Wisconsin adopt verbatim the definitions of "sexual contact" from
their penal codes.4 7 Basically, these statutes adhere to the "bikini
rule"-a psychotherapist cannot touch or allow the patient to
touch any part of the body that is normally covered by a bikini
bathing suit.40 8 Some states, however, extend the scope of pro-
hibited touching. For example, Minnesota's definition also in-
cludes the buttocks and thighs.409 The Minnesota statute provides:
"Sexual contact" means any of the following, whether or not
occurring with the consent of a patient or former patient:
(1) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse
or any intrusion, however slight, into the genital or anal
openings of the patient's or former patient's body by any part
of the psychotherapist's body or by any object used by the
psychotherapist for this purpose, or any intrusion, however
slight, into the genital or anal openings of the psychotherapist's
404. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para, 801(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
405. Id.
406. See WIs. STAT. ANN. 455.01(6) (West 1988).
407. See CAL. PENAL CODE 243.4(d) (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. S 940.225(5)(b) (West
Supp. 1989). Focusing on genital contact ignores the true nature of the boundary violation.
See supra note 49; infra text accompanying notes 412-13. Attempting to describe all
possible situations in which liability could attach, however, would be even more difficult.
One could make a determination of what constitutes "sexual contact" on a case-by-case
basis using the reasonable man standard. One problem with this approach is that it would
again introduce the discretion of an uneducated court system and would perhaps lead to
the same problems that exist in the common law.
408. Author Linda Jorgenson originally created the term "bikini rule."
409. See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.01(7) (West 1989).
7051991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
body by any part of the patient's or former patient's body or
by any object used by the patient or former patient for this
purpose, if agreed to by the psychotherapist;
(2) kissing of, or the intentional touching by the psychother-
apist of the patient's or former patient's genital area, groin,
inner thigh, buttocks, or breast or of the clothing covering any
of these body parts;
(3) kissing of, or the intentional touching by the patient or
former patient of the psychotherapist's genital area, groin,
inner thigh, buttocks, or breast or of the clothing covering any
of these body parts if the psychotherapist agrees to the kissing
or intentional touching.
"Sexual contact" includes requests by the psychotherapist
for conduct described in clauses (1) to (3).
"Sexual contact" does not include conduct described in clause
(1) or (2) that is a part of standard medical treatment of a
patient.410
Illinois duplicates the Minnesota statute.411 Although these
definitions severely restrict the zones of behavior, many sexually
exploitative behaviors remain outside the scope of the prohibi-
tions. For example, these statutes do not prohibit pornographic
videos or, as occurred in California, cases in which a psychother-
apist branded his patients. 412 It is difficult to draft a statute
sufficiently broad to cover all forms of sexual exploitation. It
seems unnecessary, however, to graft a criminal code definition
of "sexual contact" onto a civil statute. The civil definition need
not be as specific as the criminal to meet constitutional require-
ments. 413 By restricting the range of prohibited behavior only to
that which is also criminal, the statute cannot cover even ex-
tremely sadistic acts in which touching of the genitals or other
specified body parts does not occur.
(d) Class of Plaintiffs
The four states that have passed civil statutes protect not only
patients but also some former patients.41 4 California's provision
410. Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps legislators should add kissing on the mouth to the
list of prohibited behavior.
411. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 801(1)(f) (Smith-Hurd 1989). Note that both statutes
cover requests for such contact.
412. See Psychotherapist's Sexual Involvement with Patients: Hearings on SB1004 Before
Comm. on Bonded Indebtedness and Methods of Financing, Aug. 24, 1989 (floor statement
of Daniel Boatwright, California State Senator) (on file with the authors).
413. States must draft criminal statutes so as to defeat challenges based on vagueness.
Such challenges are not available to civil defendants. See supra notes 191-211 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine.
414. See infra notes 415-26 and accompanying text.
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covers former patients who received psychotherapy within two
years of sexual contact with their therapists.415 Both Illinois and
Minnesota restrict a former patient's standing to sue.416 Their
statutes require that a former patient prove that she was emo-
tionally dependent upon the psychotherapist at the time of the
contact or that sexual contact resulted from therapeutic decep-
tion, such as when the therapist leads the plaintiff to believe
that the sexual contact is necessary to her therapy.417 California
eliminates the need to prove either: any sexual contact with a
patient within two years of termination is negligence per se.418
Wisconsin's statute is unique in that it covers any person who
suffers an injury as a result of sexual contact with a therapist
who has rendered psychotherapy to that person.419 Under the
Wisconsin statute, apparently the plaintiff no longer must prove
that she is a member of the protected class; rather, the defendant
must prove that the plaintiff is not.420 One may argue that the
statute covers any former patient who has suffered harm.
The purpose of including a period of time after termination,
even though the period may be arbitrary, is to recognize the
power asymmetry between therapist and patient that extends
beyond the termination of the relationship. Studies bear out the
wisdom of including at least a six-month prohibition, as the vast
majority of sexual exploitation cases occur during therapy or
within six months of termination.421
Some psychoanalysts take the Wisconsin view one step further,
holding that once a person becomes a patient, the therapist must
always regard her as a patient.42 This extreme view discounts
the fact that a patient and therapist could develop a personal
relationship with each other at some point that the prior thera-
peutic relationship would not influence. Statutorily setting an
arbitrary period of prohibition following termination appears to
decrease the likelihood of a psychotherapist abusing a former
415. See CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990); see also Noto v. St. Vincent's
Hosp. & Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 292, 296, 537 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1988),
aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 656, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
416. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802(2) (Smith-Hurd 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN.
148A.02(2).
417. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802(2)(a)(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 148A.02(2).
418. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.93(b)(2).
419. See Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 895.70(2) (West Supp. 1989).
420. See id.
421. See, e.g., Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein, & Localio, Prevalence of Psyckiatrist-
Patient Sexual Contact, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 11 (G.
Gabbard ed. 1989); see also Gartrell & Herman, supra note 65, at 1126.
422. See M. Stone, supra note 32, at 675-76; see also supra note 419 and accompanying
text.
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patient who has unresolved transference feelings. Some psy-
chiatrists have recommended that the therapist refer the patient
to a subsequent therapist to work through such transference and
if both parties are still interested after therapy, they might then
pursue a romantic relationship. 42
Each of these approaches curtails or eliminates sexual exploi-
tation of former patients. The imposition of a time period in
which sexual contact is prohibited probably will not cover all
instances of exploitative behavior;42 however, statistics indicate
that this approach, which is easier to apply statutorily than the
others, would protect most victims. 425 The risk-management ap-
proach, which Wisconsin apparently followed to some extent, will
protect against all abuse of former patients, but it is probably
unconstitutional.42 6 The idea of referring a patient to another
counselor is idealistic at best, and the prohibition is easier to
circumvent than the imposition of a set time period.
3. Special Concerns
(a) Statute of Limitations
The states that passed civil actions against psychotherapists
also considered statute of limitations problems.42 Therapists'
exploitation severely traumatizes many of their victims. The
traumatic nature of the damage often prevents victims from
being able to confront their former therapists for many years.
Transference, extreme guilt, humiliation, and depression stop
victims from pursuing their legal rights. Furthermore, some
423. See Coleman, supra note 102, at 19; see also supra note 246.
424. One should note that the transference/countertransference phenomenon may still
be active following termination and may render a former patient vulnerable to an
exploitative therapist. See generally Gabbard & Pope, Sexual Intimacies After Termination:
Clinical, Ethical and Legal Aspects, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATION-
SHIPS 116-28 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989) (transference continues after treatment is terminated
and is "never fully resolved"); Gartrell & Herman, supra note 65 (discussing psychiatrists'
views on posttermination sexual contact).
425. See Gartrell & Herman, supra note 65, at 1128. When sexual contact occurred
only after termination, it began within one month in 18% of the cases and within six
months in 63% of the cases. Id. Therefore, this approach would protect all patients and
a majority of former patients. See id.
426. Critics frequently raise the argument that an absolute prohibition violates the
patient's and psychotherapist's freedom of association. A discussion of the legal merits
of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
427. See infra text accompanying notes 428-38.
708 [Vol. 32:645
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT SEXUAL CONTACT
therapists have threatened, intimidated, or manipulated their
patients.42 Often, the psychotherapist so damages his sexually
exploited patients that by the time they realize the harm and
are able to pursue a cause of action, the civil statute of limitations
has run.429
The California and Minnesota task forces both suggested that
legislatures expand their statutes of limitations for patient sexual
exploitation.430 Recently, Minnesota amended its statute of limi-
tations to provide that a plaintiff may bring a negligence action
within six years from the time the plaintiff knows or has reason
to know that sexual abuse caused the injury.431 The statute is
suspended during the disability.43 Wisconsin requires the plaintiff
to bring an action within three years.4s3 If the patient is unable
to bring an action against an offending therapist because of the
damaging effects of the sexual abuse or because of any threats
or statements by the therapist, the statute extends the limitations
period to fifteen years.4
Lengthening the statute of limitations does not, in itself, raise
difficult equity issues. Any extension of the statute of limitations,
however, must be fair to both the patient and the accused
psychotherapist. Stale cases raise the problem of access to, re-
cords years after the fact, which unfairly inhibits the right to
gather evidence. 43 5 The therapist's entitlement to a closure of old
428. See CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 2; MINNESOTA, REPORT
OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 1041.
429. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (court relied
on findings that plaintiff did not know of injury within statutory period); Greenberg v.
McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (because injury and cause were subtler
than normal malpractice, inappropriate to determine as a matter of law what plaintiff
should have known), affd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cr.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); Lenhard
v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (statute of limitations barred claim
despite transference phenomenon).
430. See CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 12 (suggesting five
years); MINNESOTA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 32-33 (suggesting statute
of limitations tolls when client is unable to complain for a period of time due to effects
of sexual contact or due to "threats, instructions or statements").
431. See 1989 Minn. Laws 190 § 2.
432. Id.
433. WIS. STAT. ANN. S 893.585(1) (West Supp. 1989).
434. The Wisconsin statute provides:
If a person entitled to bring the action . . . is unable to bring the action
due to the effects of the sexual contact or due to any threats, instructions
or statements from the therapist, the period of inability is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action, except that this subsection
shall not extend the time limitation by more than 15 years.
Id. S 893.585(2).
435. See CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 12-13.
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occurrences at some point, however, should not allow him to hide
unfairly behind a procedural limitation.436
The uncertainty created by the "capacity to bring suit" troubles
many.43 7 These statutes raise a problem in that they require a
mental health professional to determine whether a victim was
competent to file suit and to assess the victim's capacity to file
suit over a substantial period of time. As Appelbaum aptly noted,
"If the plaintiffs capacities varied over time . ..some estimate
of the period during which the plaintiff might have been com-
petent-and therefore during which the clock would be ticking
on the statute of limitations -will be require d."438 Courts could
more easily apply a clear statute of limitations. Unless the limi-
tation were fifteen or twenty years, however, the statute would
hinder many victims from coming forward.
(b) Employer Liability
Unfortunately, employment of therapists by agencies and in-
stitutions does not insure patients against sexual exploitation.
Fourteen percent of psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation
occurs in agencies or institutions. 439 A careful screening may
prevent this exploitation if the offending psychotherapist has
abused patients at other institutions as well. Under common law
principles of respondeat superior and negligent supervision,440
employers are responsible for their employees' acts. Generally,
for liability to attach, the employer must either know or have
reason to know that the psychotherapist would sexually exploit
patients.441
436. The Wisconsin statute of limitations gives the therapist some time protection. See
WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 893.585(2). Prejudice to the therapist is unlikely because the evidence
is still within his control. Critics of a fixed time limitation may argue that some victims
will still be unaware of their injuries within that period. Fifteen years, however, will
give most victims sufficient time to come forward. Balanced against an accused therapist's
rights, it appears that an extension beyond this period may be undesirable.
The application of the so-called "discovery rule" to this area of the law would avoid
the problems created by a fixed limitation period. Authors Jorgenson and Randles
advocated this position in Brief for Appellant at 14.39, Riley v. Presnell, No. DAR-5238
(Mass.) (argued Oct. 3, 1990). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court accepted this
argument in ruling that the discovery rule should apply to psychotherapist malpractice
cases. See Riley v. Presnell, No. SJC-5343, slip op. at 16 (Mass. Jan. 28, 1991). Nevertheless,
an.indepth discussion of this area exceeds the scope of this Article.
437. See, e.g., Appelbaum, Commentary, 2 EXPERT OPINION Forensic Newsletter Div.,
Forensic Mental Health 8 (Fall 1988).
438. Id. at 9.
439. K. POPE & J. BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 72, at 152.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 319-40.
441. Id.
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No uniform standard governs an employer before liability at-
taches; rather, the employer must scrutinize the employee's acts
and omissions on a case-by-case basis." 2 The lack of a uniform
standard leads to unjustified differences in results and allows an
employer who knows of prohibited conduct to do nothing.443 For
example, California task force members learned of several cases
in which employers had actual knowledge of employee sexual
involvement with patients but chose to take no action." 4 As a
result of the task force's findings, California now requires a
psychotherapist or a psychotherapist's employer who becomes
aware that a previous psychotherapist sexually exploited a pa-
tient to furnish that patient with a state-prepared brochure
explaining the patient's rights."5 Failure to discuss this brochure
constitutes unprofessional conduct to which administrative pen-
alties apply."6 Interestingly, this requirement does not extend to
former patients even though the civil statute covers them for a
period of two years after termination of treatment. 7
Minnesota and Illinois have passed more comprehensive legis-
lation.448 In these states, an employer may be civilly liable if the
employer knows or has reason to know that a psychotherapist
sexually exploited a patient or former patient and the employer
fails to take appropriate and timely action." 9 This duty extends
well beyond the passing out of pamphlets. 410
442. Compare Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1984) (employer
not liable for employee's sexual misconduct as "[n]othing in the records suggests that
[the employee] considered his sexual adventures to be a bonafide part of the therapy he
was employed to provide") with Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d 344, 348
(Alaska 1990) (employer liable for employee's sexual misconduct as "it could reasonably
be concluded that the resulting sexual conduct was 'incidental' to the therapy").
443. See Andrews, 732 F.2d at 368.
444. CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra, note 156, at 13.
445. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE SS 337, 728(a) (West 1990); see also infra note 534
(discussing California's brochure).
446. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 728(b).
447. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE S 43.93(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (former patient has a cause
of action against violating psychotherapist for two years) with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 728(a) (employer required to provide a present patient with a brochure if patient had
alleged sexual contact with a previous psychotherapist).
448. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 803(3) (Smith-Hurd 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN.
148A.03 (West 1989).
449. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 803(3); MIm. STAT. ANN. S 148A.03(a)(1).
450. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.03 (employer must take "reasonable action" if
there is reason to know sexual contact with patients occurred previously) and ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70, para. 803(3) (employer must take "reasonable action") with CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE S 728(a) (employer must provide brochure).
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Minnesota has established specific procedures for safeguarding
against abusive therapists.45' Employers of psychotherapists must
write to a job applicant's employers for the previous five years
to ascertain whether the applicant has a history of sexual ex-
ploitation. 452 When a prospective employer sends a written re-
quest and an authorization release to a former employer, the
former employer must respond in writing or else this employer
will be liable for the future damages that such failure causes a
patient.45 Minnesota reports that its employer liability rules have
been very successful.45 Placing an affirmative duty on the em-
ployer lessens the plaintiffs difficulties in bringing a negligent
supervision action because the statute clearly defines the stan-
dard of care.415 The major limitation of this kind of statute is
that an employer in a different state would not have to comply
unless the law of that state imposed a similar duty.
(c) Victim Shield
A necessary addition to any legislative enactment concerning
psychotherapist-patient exploitation is a victim shield statute.
Because a therapist can never justify engaging in sexual activity
with his client, the victim's sexual history or consent should be
irrelevant in any judicial proceeding. Given the fiduciary nature
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, the psychotherapist
bears the responsibility of abstaining from sexual exploitation,
regardless of provocation. 456
The defendant often calculates admission of the plaintiff's sex-
ual history to humiliate and embarrass the victim and to dis-
451. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.03(b); see also MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S NEVER O.K.:
PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at app. B-I.
452. See MINN. TASK FORCE, IT'S NEVER O.K.: PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1,
at app. B-1.
453. See id.
454. See id. at 147-52.
455. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.03.
456. See K. POPE & J. BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 72, at 124:
It is important to recognize that the therapist is solely responsiblefor ensuring
that sexual contact with the patient never, under any circumstances, occurs. If
the patient was seductive, desired sex, or in any way attempted to involve
the therapist in activities that were not therapeutic, it was still the sole
responsibility of the therapist to deal with that behavior and explore it
professionally and therapeutically rather than to exploit it. To do otherwise
was to act in an unethical and clinically destructive manner. There is never
an ethical or clinical justification for a therapist to participate in sex with a
patient.
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courage her from taking action or to cause courts to try her
along with the therapist. Nevertheless, when assessing the extent
of damages, the court may appropriately elicit the victim's sexual
history. If the victim alleges damage to sexual function, the court
in fairness must allow the defendant to inquire about the victim's
sexual history. Furthermore, the need to evaluate the possibility
that personality disorders predating the sexual abuse caused
certain symptoms may also justify inquiry into the plaintiffs
sexual history.4 7 In addition, a defense against a false accusation
may entail the demonstration of sexual delusions about a number
of persons. 4 8
All of the states that have passed psychotherapist sexual
exploitation statutes included a victim shield provision that deems
prior sexual history irrelevant for purposes of both discovery
and admission at trial.459 All of the statutes passed to date,
however, do allow the defendant to introduce this type of evi-
dence if the court accepts an offer of proof setting forth the
evidence the defendant will use and the purpose of the evi-
dence.460
(d) Summary
One of the most significant differences in the common law and
the new civil statutory schemes is the coverage they afford to
457. But cf. Letter from Susan Beck, Member to the Statutes Subcommittee of the
Massachusetts House Committee on Sexual Misconduct by Physicians, to Mass. State
Rep. Salvador DiMasi, House Chairman Joint Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 6, 1990).
Responding to this issue, Beck stated that a Massachusetts court found that the victim
shield component of the Massachusetts rape statute did not bar evidence of the victim's
prior allegations of sexual misconduct because such allegations did not constitute "'sexual
conduct:'" Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95, 378 N.E.2d 987,
991 (1978)). However, "a complaining witness's prior arrests as a prostitute were [held
by the SJC to be] relevant in [another] rape prosecution:' Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 231, 415 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1981)). Beck noted that "the existing case
law seeks to prevent ... the practice of humiliating a complainant in an effort to
discourage him or her from continuing with the case." Id.
458. But Cf. MINNESOTA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 30 ("Testimony
from psychotherapy professionals and research in the field has indicated that accusations
of sexual exploitation by clients..are usually not fabricated or a misinterpretation on the
client's part.").
459. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 804-05 (Smith-Hurd 1989) (regarding scope of
discovery); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.05 (regarding admission of evidence); Wis. STAT.
ANN. S 901.04(3)(C) (West Supp. 1990) (regarding admission of evidence).
460. "In an action for sexual exploitation, evidence of the plaintiffs sexual history is
not subject to discovery except when the plaintiff claims damage to sexual function-
ing ...." MiNN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.04; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 804-05;
Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 901.04(3)(C).
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former patients.461 All four states with a civil cause of action
protect former patients.462 The expanded coverage ranges from
one year in Illinois to an indefinite period of time in Wisconsin 46-
certainly an increase over the time generally allowed by common
law.464 Civil statutes prohibiting psychotherapist-patient sexual
exploitation also expressly define the standard of care required
of psychotherapists. 465 This prohibition is a great advantage over
the common law.
In addition, all four civil statutes addressing psychotherapist-
patient sexual exploitation include victim shield provisions. 466
These provisions are important to protect the victim from ha-
rassment while she pursues her rights. Furthermore, these civil
statutes explicitly prohibit sexual contact regardless of the vic-
tim's consent to the sexual act.467 Some of the statutes also
provide a unique opportunity to hold employers accountable for
their negligent hiring practices.46
461. See supra notes 414-26 and accompanying text.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. In an action by a former patient for sexual contact occurring after the termination
of therapy, a plaintiff will be required to prove the defendant owed a "duty" to her. See
supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text. If no professional relationship exists, does a
legal duty to refrain from sexual contact exist? This question must be litigated case by
case. In Noto v. Saint Vincent's Hospital & Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 292, 296, 537
N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 656, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990), the court, in deciding whether sexual relations with a patient after termination of
a professional psychiatric relationship is actionable, concluded:
While no similar statute [to Minnesota or California] has been enacted in
New York to date, under the facts here and taking into consideration Dr.
Sears [sic] affidavit, the complaint can fairly be viewed as analogous to a
cause of. action for medical malpractice based on the seduction of the patient.
Id.
Controversy surrounds whether former patients should be extended special protection.
See generally Coleman, supra note 102 (describing impetus behind total prohibition and
why such a rule is unduly restrictive).
465. See CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93 (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 70, para. 801-02
(Smith-Hurd 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 148A.01-02 (West 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN § 895.70
(West Supp. 1990).
466. See CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93(d) (victim shield); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 805
(regarding admission of evidence); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.04 (regarding scope of
discovery); id. S 148A.05 (regarding admission of evidence); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 901.04()
(victim shield).
467. See supra text accompanying notes 388, 395-96. Illinois and Minnesota prohibit all
sexual contact that occurs in the office. For any acts occurring outside the office setting
or following termination of the therapeutic relationship, however, a plaintiff must show
emotional dependence or allege that the sexual contact occurred by means of therapeutic
deception. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802, S 2(a)(1), (2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.02(2).
468. See supra notes 439-55 and accompanying text.
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The lingering damage of sexual intimacy during a therapeutic
relationship bears upon the length of time in which a plaintiff
must bring suit. A psychotherapist's sexual exploitation of a
patient requires an extended limitations period because the vic-
tim is often so loathe to face her abuser that years may pass
before she comes forward.4 9 In addition, abusive therapists may
use a subtle form of mind-control or brainwashing to prevent a
victim from fully realizing what has happened. As a result of
these circumstances, the victim may fail to timely realize the
damages she has sustained, and the statute of limitations may
run. States should therefore expand the statute of limitations on
psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation actions.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTES
A. Introduction
Administrative licensing procedures are the final method states
employ to regulate psychotherapist sexual exploitation. All states
license psychiatrists and psychologists, and forty-eight states
license or register social workers.470 A minority of states license
family and marriage counselors, drug and chemical dependency
workers, and educational psychologists.471
In many states, however, a person without any specific quali-
fications may hold himself out as a psychotherapist. Unlicensed
and unregistered therapists represent a sizeable loophole in the
regulation of the psychotherapeutic profession.472 Nevertheless,
469. See supra notes 427-38 and accompanying text.
470. See QUALITY ASSURANCE DEP'T, NAT'L ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, STATE COMPAR-
ISON OF LAWS REGULATING SOCIAL WORK (1991).
471. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-43-503, -603 (Supp. 1990) (licensure for marriage
and family therapists and professional counselors).
472. See CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 29; MINNESOTA, REPORT
OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 40-41. Three states-Minnesota, Colorado, and Florida-
recently enacted administrative statutes that address unlicensed therapists. See COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 12-43-101, -711; FLA. STAT. ANN. S 490.012 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 148-B40-B47 (1989 & Supp. 1990). Colorado provides:
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that, in order to safeguard
the public health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state and in order
to protect the people of this state against the unauthorized, unqualified, and
improper application of psychotherapy, psychology, clinical social work, mar-
riage and family therapy, professional counseling, and school psychology, it
is necessary that the proper regulatory authorities be established and ade-
quately provided for. The general assembly further finds that, in order to
best provide such protections and safeguards and to expedite complaints and
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state board regulations provide the most comprehensive regula-
tory scheme and are an important component to any survey of
the law in this area.
Half of the states have recently enacted regulations or legis-
lation that specifically list psychotherapists' sexual contact as
unprofessional conduct for which disciplinary action is appropri-
ate.473 At least a dozen states have regulations that denounce
immoral or lewd conduct as unprofessional. 474
B. Scope of Power and Features of Board Regulation
1. Scope
The legislatures of each state delegate to boards of registration
the power to regulate psychotherapeutic professions. In the en-
abling statutes, the legislatures frequently define the purpose
and nature of the licensing boards.475
disciplinary proceedings relating to the practice and delivery of psychother-
apy, psychology, clinical social work, marriage and family therapy, profes-
sional counseling services, and school psychology, there shall be established
a grievance board with the authority to take disciplinary actions or bring
injunctive actions or both concerning unlicensed psychotherapists, licensed
psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, licensed marriage and family
therapists, licensed professional counselors, and certified school psycholo-
gists.
COLO. REV. STAT. S 12-43-101. Colorado has attempted to regulate the unlicensed through
the state grievance board. See id. S 12-43-704(1)(3). The grievance board shall find that
any psychotherapist who engaged in sexual contact with a client during the time of a
professional relationship or within six months after a professional relationship terminated
engaged in unprofessional conduct. See id S 12-43-704(1)(q). The grievance board may
revoke the therapist's license and may obtain an injunction against an unlicensed therapist
to prevent that therapist from practicing. Id S 12-4-704.5(3). Further, the statute allows
a civil cause of action sounding in strict liability for prohibited sexual contact: "Damages
for injury or death occurring as a result of the services may be recovered in an appropriate
action without any showing of negligence." Id. S 12-43-707(5)(b). A client may recover any
money paid if the psychotherapist engages in sexual contact with her. Id. § 12-43-707(5)(a).
Unlicensed therapists who commit any act prohibited by the statute may be perpetually
enjoined from practicing psychotherapy. See id. S 12-43-708(2); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. S
491.012 (therapist licensing statute); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 148.B40-B47 (establishes board
that regulates unlicensed therapists).
473. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. S 32-2081(5)(f) (1986) ("The certificate of any person
certified by the board may be suspended or revoked by the board or the person may be
placed on probation . . .[if he hias engaged in unprofessional conduct which shall include
...[slexual intimacies with clients.").
474. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. S 08.64.326(a)(9) (1962) ("engaged in unprofessional conduct
or in lewd or immoral conduct in connection with the delivery of professional services to
patients"); ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 17-93-409(7) (1987) (grounds for denial, suspension, or
revocation of medical license include "[g]rossly negligent or ignorant malpractice").
475. For example, Texas' enabling statute states, "T]he practice of medicine is a
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States generally give the professional review boards the power
and responsibility of establishing each profession's code of ethics
and of enforcing them through administrative rules. Because the
boards conduct legislative and judicial functions, state courts may
review all final decisions of each board pursuant to each state's
Administrative Procedure Act.476
The scope of power that legislatures grant to the boards varies
from state to state. In many states, the legislature completely
forfeits control over licensing by granting to boards the power
to decide what conduct to proscribe.477 In other states, boards
supplement, refine, and define the grounds for finding unprofes-
sional conduct through rulemaking procedures and case adjudi-
cation.478 In all states, the boards' powers are generally broad so
as to avoid the evidentiary and procedural difficulties that could
arise in criminal and civil proceedings. 479
2. Features
Administrative boards have a variety of features that are
advantageous to a complaining party. A broad range of sanctions,
from reprimands and fines to injunctive relief and prison terms,
privilege and not a natural right of individuals and as a matter of policy it is considered
necessary to protect the public interest through the specific formulation of this Act to
regulate . . . ." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, S 1.02(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990); see
also COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-101 (1985) (stating the legislative declaration for "a proper
regulatory authority").
476. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4512c, S 8, 6252-13a, SS 3(l), 19.
477. For example, Oklahoma's legislature declared a broad code of ethics for psychol-
ogists, stating:
The Board shall publish a code of ethics. The code shall take into account
the professional character of psychological service and shall be designed to
protect the interest of the client and the public. In developing and revising
this code, the Board shall hold hearings where interested persons may be
heard on the subject and the Board may take into account the Ethical
Standards of Psychologists promulgated by the American Psychological As-
sociation.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1361 (West 1989).
478. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, 5 1731(b)(17) (1988) (allows board to discipline one
whom the board determines engaged in "unprofessional conduct," which is defined as
"[t]he violation of this chapter, or the violation of an order or regulation of the Board
directly related to medical procedures, the performance of which would harm or injure
the public or any individual"); D.C. CODE ANN. S 2-3305.14(a)(24) (1988) (allows board to
impose sanctions upon persons regulated by the board who "[v]iolate[ ] any provision of
this chapter or rules and regulations issued pursuant to this chapter"); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. S 311.565(1) (MichiejBobbs-Merrili 1990) (allows board to exercise all administrative
functions of the state).
479. See infra text accompanying notes 480-520.
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
are available to boards.480 The burden of proof and the rules of
evidence are generally more relaxed than those of civil or criminal
courts, and most states provide for either no statutes of limita-
tions or have longer statutes of limitations for board actions.481
Some boards provide victim shield protection similar to that
afforded rape victims in most jurisdictions. 482
Administrative boards also tend to be more sensitive to the
issues raised by intraprofessional reporting. Boards in some states
protect from liability those reporting suspected unethical or un-
professional acts, and boards in other states protect individual
board members. 48
Finally, boards have addressed the issue of whether the law
should require a subsequent treating therapist to report a former
therapist's sexual abuse of a patient. States' responses to this
issue have ranged from mandating reporting over the victim's
objections to refusing to require any reporting.4 4
Not only do different states vary in their treatment of this
area of the law, but different boards within each state differ as
well. The following Section discusses this inconsistency in appli-
cation.
(a) Wide Range of Available Sanctions
The range of sanctions available to boards allows wide discre-
tion in fashioning appropriate relief. Typically, a board may issue
a private reprimand, public reprimand, probation, suspension,
limitation, denial of license, or revocation of license.485 A board
also may set conditions for continued practice, including monitor-
ing the psychotherapist's conduct through supervision.486 Most
states allow boards to fine offenders, and a few states allow
orders for restitution.487
480. See infra text accompanying notes 485-93.
481. See infra text accompanying notes 494-508, 510-16.
482. See infra text accompanying notes 517-20.
483. See infra text accompanying notes 521-22.
484. See infra text accompanying notes 523-42.
485. Courts have upheld the power of boards to revoke the licenses of those they
regulate. See, e.g., Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 950, 123
Cal. Rptr. 563, 575 (1975) (revocation of psychiatrist's license); Bernstein v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 204 Cal. App. 2d 378, 386, 22 Cal. Rptr. 419, 424 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(revocation of psychiatrist's license); Morra v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists,
212 Kan. 103, 112, 510 P.2d 614, 622 (1973) (revocation of psychologist's license upheld on
appeal).
486. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4400-37 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
487. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-707(5)(a) (Supp. 1990) (patient "entitled to recover
the amount of any fee paid for the services").
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Some states provide criminal sanctions for violations of an
administrative board's disciplinary rules. In Louisiana, a violation
of any disciplinary rule may be a misdemeanor. 4e Texas follows
a similar procedure; the State may enjoin or criminally prosecute
a therapist for a misdemeanor.489 Hawaii has an especially strin-
gent sanction: the board regulation for psychologists allows both
a fine and a jail term for up to one year.490
Several states have taken an innovative approach involving
injunctive relief. In these states, after a board finds a violation
of the disciplinary rules, it requests that a court enjoin the
psychotherapist from committing any act that further violates
the disciplinary rules. 491 Should the offending psychologist commit
another enjoined act, he will be "summarily" tried and punished
for contempt of court.492 Courts may accord injunctive relief in
addition to all other remedies, including criminal prosecution.493
(b) Lower Burden of Proof
Before the board issues any sanction, state laws require a
hearing in which the complainant or the board by its own action
must prove the occurrence. 49 4 Although the standard of proof
488. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 37:2360(A)(4) (West 1988) ("It shall be a misdemeanor
[ . . f]or any person to otherwise violate the provisions of this Chapter").
489. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512c, S 24 (Vernon 1976) (Texas board has
right to institute action in own name to enjoin violation; injunction in addition to other
actions; represented by attorney general or district attorneys).
490. See HAW. REV. STAT. 5 465-15(b) (Supp. 1989) ("Any person who violates this
chapter shall be fined not more than $1,000 for each violation of this chapter or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both').
491. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. S 12-43-708(2-(4) (providing additionally that the "board
shall not be required to allege or prove either that an adequate remedy at law does not
exist or that substantial or irreparable damage would result"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5
37:2361(B) ("The board may apply for an injunction in any court of competent jurisdiction
to enjoin any person from committing any act which is in violation of this Chapter");
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512c, 5 24 ("The Texas State Board of Examiners of
Psychologists shall have the right to institute an action in its own name to enjoin the
violation of any provisions of this Act").
492. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 37:2361(D) ("In case of violation of any injunction
issued under the provisions of this Section, the court may summarily try and punish the
offender for contempt of court.").
493. See id. § 37:2361(E) ("Such injunctive proceedings shall be in addition to, and not
in lieu of, all penalties and other remedies:').
494. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 32-2082(A) (1986) ("A certificate shall not be
suspended or revoked and a psychologist shall not be placed on probation until after a
hearing'); ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 17-93-410(b) (Supp. 1989) (providing for a hearing to be
scheduled within 30 days of the mailing of a copy of the complaint to the defendant);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 20-45 (West 1989) ("Proceedings relative to the revocation,
suspension or annulment of a license or toward disciplinary action may be begun by the
filing of written charges, verified by affidavit, by the commissioner of health services:').
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required for finding a violation of a disciplinary rule varies,
typically the board must find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the therapist engaged in the prohibited practice, even if the
therapist is subject to criminal sanctions.495
All of the board members need not find a violation. For
example, in Louisiana, four out of five board members must find
that a violation exists:
The board shall have the power and duty to suspends place on
probation, require remediation for a specified time, revoke any
license to practice psychology, or take any other action speci-
fied in the rules and regulations whenever the board, by
affirmative vote of at least four of its five members, shall find
by a preponderance of the evidence that a psychologist has
engaged in any of the following acts or offenses:
(2) Practicing psychology in such a manner as to endanger
the welfare of clients or patients, including but not limited to:
(a) Harassment, intimidation, or abuse, sexual or otherwise,
of a client or patient.
(b) Engaging in sexual intercourse or other sexual contact
with a client or patient.4 96
In Massachusetts, the standard is also a preponderance of the
evidence.497 The law does not require the respondent to testify
in any hearing; however, the board may draw an adverse infer-
ence from his failure to take the stand.498
Likewise, in Oklahoma, the board may sanction a respondent
in his absence. 499 The State Board of Examiners of Psychologists
can require a psychologist to appear before the Board.wt If the
psychologist does not appear, the Board may hold the hearing in
his absence.51' If a majority of the Board decides that the psy-
495. See, e.g., Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Commissioner of Ins.,
395 Mass. 43, 46, 478 N.E.2d 936, 941 (1985). But see In re Zar, 434 N.W.2d 598, 602 (SmD.
1989) (standard of proof for license revocation proceedings is "clear and convincing
evidence").
496. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. S 37:2359B2) (emphasis added).
497. See Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 395 Mass. at 46, 478 N.E.2d at
941 (preponderance of evidence generally applicable to administrative proceedings).
498. See In re Sze K. Kaan, No. 86-12-BO, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Bd. of Registration in
Med. May 6, 1987) (citing Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1034 (1978)).
499. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 S 1370(E) (West 1989) ("If the psychologist fails or refuses
to appear, the Board may proceed to hearing and determine the charges in his absence.").
500. Id. S 1370(B).
501. Id. S 1370(E).
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chologist committed the alleged act of unprofessional conduct,
the Board may impose any authorized penalty, including license
revocation.0e2
(c) Less Stringent Rules of Evidence
Strict rules of evidence often do not apply to board hearings.ee 3
In fact, some states permit the reviewing body to rely on its
own expertise and specialized knowledge of the area rather than
the tabula rasa, or blank slate, jurors are expected to bring to
a proceeding.ee 4 The board's power to evaluate the evidence in a
hearing before it is coextensive with a judicial body's discretion.
In an adjudicatory proceeding, when hearing officers evaluate
conflicting evidence, their credibility assessment is "largely un-
reviewable by the courts." 50e In Block v. Ambach,506 the court
reasoned:
Although petitioner Block argues to us that the complainant's
testimony against him was unreliable, her credibility was a
matter for the Hearing Panel to resolve and judicial review of
the agency's determination is limited to the question of whether
there is substantial evidence in the record to support that
determinationm °7
In Iowa, the legislature gave the board extensive powers to
evaluate evidence508 This broad delegation of power makes the
board's findings virtually unreviewable.
502. Id.
503. See, e.g., Damino v. Board of Regents, 124 A.D.2d 271, 272, 508 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620
(1986) (strict rules of evidence are not binding).
504. See, e.g., In re Fong, No. 02-87465 DIA NO. 88DPHMB-5, slip op. at 1 (Iowa Bd.
Med. Examiners Sept. 13, 1988) (panel to review complaints filed with the Iowa State
Board of Medical Examiners composed of three doctors alone). Other states, however, fill
their boards with a mix of practicing professionals and laypersons. See, e.g., COLO. REv.
STAT. 5 12-43-302(2) (Supp. 1990) (five psychologists and two laypersons); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 453-5(a) (1985) (seven physicians and two lay members of the public); IDAHO CODE § 54-
1806A(1) (Supp. 1990) (four physicians and one member of good character not licensed to
practice medicine or surgery).
505. Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443, 517 N.E.2d 193, 196, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478,
481 (1987) (in police disciplinary hearing, assessment of credibility left to hearing officer);
see also Block v. Ambacb, 73 N.Y.2d 323, 335, 537 N.E.2d 181, 186-87, 540 N.Y.S.2d 6, 11-
12 (1989) (credibility is a matter for hearing panel to resolve; judicial review limited to
whether substantial evidence supports that determination).
506. 73 N.Y.2d 323, 537 N.E.2d 181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 6.
507. Id. at 335, 537 N.E.2d at 186, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
508. See Fong, No. 02-87-465 DIA NO. 88DPHMB-5, slip op. at 7, in which the board
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(d) Longer Statute of Limitations
Perhaps the most advantageous aspect of board hearings for
complainants is that the vast majority of states do not impose a
time limit on bringing actions against licensed therapists. In In
re Fong,5°9 the Iowa board found that a twelve-year lapse did not
bar an action.510 In that case, the doctor had responded earlier
to the same charges at the Polk County Medical Society.51' The
board held that the prior record could refresh the doctor's rec-
ollection as to the events at issue.51 2 The appellate court upheld
the board's ruling, finding that the delay did not violate due
process and that the doctrine of laches did not bar the action:
The Respondent-Appellant argued on appeal that the Board's
action in pursuing the complaint of patient number one after
the passage of twelve years denied the Respondent due proc-
ess. There was no due process violation. The Board pursued
this complaint as soon as it found out about it, and there was
no prejudice to the Respondent by the delay ...
The Respondent-Appellant argued that laches bars the pros-
ecution of the complaint of patient number one. Laches does
not bar this prosecution. First, the equitable doctrine of laches
is generally not available against the government. Second,
laches is only available where there has been some unreason-
able delay. In this case, patient number one filed a written
complaint with the Polk County Medical Society almost im-
mediately. The Iowa Board did not find out about this complaint
until the fall of 1987, and then did not delay in filing a complaint
against the Respondent. Additionally, the Respondent has not
been prejudiced by the lapse of time.513
stated,
The legislature specifically contemplated that the fact-finders in hearings
regarding medical licenses would be members of the medical profession with
medical expertise. [Iowa Code S] 17A.14(5) (1987) states that an "agency's
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized
in the evaluation of the evidence." The panel members certainly acted
appropriately and in the manner contemplated by the Iowa statutes and
rules when they used their medical expertise to evaluate the evidence
including expert testimony.
Id.
509. No. 02-87-465 DIA NO. 88DPHMB-5.
510. See id. slip op. at 7.
511. Id. slip op. at 4.
512. Id.
513. Id. slip op. at 8 (citation omitted).
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One should note that courts make due process determinations on
a case-by-case basis and that undue delay may bar a complaint
on due process grounds.514 In Appeal of Plantier,5 5 the court
found that a nine-year lapse from the time of the incident to the
disciplinary hearing was too long.51 6
(e) Victim Shield
In the past, hearing procedures often discouraged victims from
issuing complaints against offending therapists because the hear-
ing often became a trial of the victim's sexual history. As this
Article noted previously, the patient's sexuality, seductiveness,
attractiveness,, and sexual history are irrelevant to the proceed-
ing. 17 The therapist always has the duty not to engage in sexual
contact with his patients, regardless of their background or
behavior. 518
The Minnesota legislature passed a statute limiting the discov-
ery and admission of evidence of a patient's past sexual conduct
in a board or administrative proceeding for the revocation or
suspension of a license when the alleged violation is based on
therapist-patient sexual contact.5 9 The legislature modeled this
statute after rape shield laws that protect the victim from going
on trial heiself. The statute drastically restricts the admissibility
of the victim's past sexual conduct5 20 and, given the psychother-
apist's probable awareness of many of the painful details of the
514. See Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 509, 494 A.2d 270, 275-76 (1985), cited in
Annotation, Applicability of Statute of Limitations or Doctrine of Laches to Proceeding to
Revoke or Suspend License to Practice Medicine, 51 A.L.R.4TH 1129 (1987).
515. 126 N.H. 500, 494 A.2d 270 (1985).
516. Id. at 507-09, 494 A.2d at 274.
.517. See supra notes 456-60 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
519. See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 148A.04 (West 1989). The statute provides:
In an action for sexual exploitation, evidence of the plaintiffs sexual history
is not subject to discovery except when the plaintiff claims damage to sexual
functioning; or
(1) the defendant requests a hearing prior to conducting discovery and
makes an offer of proof of the relevancy of the history; and (2) the cdurt
finds that the history is relevant and that the probative value of the history
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
The court shall allow the discovery only of specific information or examples
of the plaintiffs conduct that are determined by the court to be relevant.
The court's order shall detail the information or conduct that is subject to
discovery.
Id.
520. See id.
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victim's past, is necessary to prevent harassment. At the same
time, the statute reflects the need to balance the protection of
victims against the necessity of assessing possible false accusa-
tions.
69 "Good Faith" Shield From Liability
* Many states specifically shield therapists who give information,
or testify about another therapist to a board, from libel, slander,
and defamation actions.521 Some states, such as Idaho, protect the
board members as well.5 22
(g) Mandatory Reporting
One of the more difficult issues confronting administrative
boards is whether to require a subsequent therapist to report a
former therapist's sexual abuse of a patient. The best available
data indicates that only four to eight percent of those who are
sexually exploited by their psychotherapist report such abuse.523
Sexually exploited patients may have many reasons for not re-
porting their abuse. They may fear public exposure for family
reasons, such as the fear of losing a spouse or children.52 In
addition, abused victims often have a great deal of difficulty
trusting subsequent therapists.525
521. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. S 63-6-214(d) (1990) ("Any doctor of medicine, any
medical society or any other person who in good faith shall report to the board any
information that a doctor of medicine is or may be in violation of any of the provisions
of subsection (b) shall not be subject to suit for civil damages as a result thereof."); Wis.
STAT. ANN. 5 940.22(5) (West Supp. 1990). In Wisconsin, subsequent treating psychother-
apists who report abusers are not liable for damages caused by the report. Id. The
Wisconsin statute states:
Any person or institution participating in good faith in the making of a
report or record under this section is immune from any civil or criminal
liability that results by reason of the action. For the purpose of any civil or
criminal action or proceeding, any person reporting under this section is
presumed to be acting in good faith.
Id.
522. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE S 54-1806A(13) (Supp. 1990).
There shall be no liability on the part of and no action for damages against:
(a) Any member of the board of professional discipline or the staff or officials
thereof for any action undertaken or performed within the scope of the
functions of said board or this chapter; or
(b) Any person providing information or testimony to the said board or its
staff or officials.
523. See K. POPE & J. BOUHOUTSOS, supra note 72, at 192; Gartrell & Herman, supra
note 75, at 289.
524. See G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 235-44.
525. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also Strasburger, Jorgenson, &
Randles, Mandatory Reporting, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 379 (1990).
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Colleagues of the offending psychotherapist frequently learn
of the offense through either their patients or other psycho-
therapists, but very few report their knowledge.5 26 Subsequent
psychotherapists are- often accused of maintaining a "conspiracy
of silence." 527 A closer analysis reveals, however, that these
charges are not wholly accurate. Important competing interests
often collide when a subsequent therapist considers whether to
report sexual abuse.
The most compelling argument against reporting is that it
breaches client confidentiality. The confidentiality that exists
between the patient and the subsequent treating psychotherapist
prevents reporting against the patient's wishes. If mandatory
reporting requirements required the therapist to break this con-
fidentiality, many patients who have already been betrayed will
suffer a second wrong or fail to go to a subsequent therapist.528
One must, however, balance the need to protect the victim from
further injury against the need to protect other patients from
exploitation.529
Even though the resolution of mandatory reporting issues is
difficult, some states have addressed the issue.00 Of those states
with laws on psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation, only
Minnesota has mandated that a subsequent therapist report the
offending psychotherapist's name in spite of the victim's objec-
tions.51 California5 2 and Wisconsin3 have mandatory reporting
526. See CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 17; Gartrell & Herman,
supra note 75, at 289-90.
527. See Stone, Sexual Misconduct by Psychiatrists: The Ethical and Clinical Dilemma
of Confidentiality, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (1983).
528. Id. at 196.
529. See George, Psychotherapist-Patient Sex: A Proposal for a Mandatory Reporting
Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 431 (1985). George takes an extreme view, arguing that the fundamental
right in privacy must give way to the compelling state interest of stopping abusive
psychotherapists. Id. He proposes a mandatory reporting statute requiring the reporting
of both the offending psychotherapist and the patient unless the reporting would be
"unusually" injurious to the patient. Id. at 446-59.
530. The task force reports of both California and Minnesota recommended a version
of mandatory reporting. CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 17;
MINNESOTA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 33-35. The Minnesota task force
found mandatory reporting to be a difficult issue to resolve. MINNESOTA, REPORT OF TASK
FORCE, supra note 156, at 33-34,"Balancing the very important needs of victims against
the needs of unsuspecting future patients is extremely difficult. See id. at 33.
531. Minnesota failed to pass a comprehensive statute dealing with mandatory report-
ing. Various boards, however, have mandatory reporting requirements. Minnesota requires
that the psychologist report by name the offending psychotherapist, even if the patient
objects. If the patient does not give the name of the offending psychotherapist, however,
the subsequent therapist is not required to guess. See G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra
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laws that leave the control of the reports up to the abused
patient. California encourages reporting by educating the victim:
Any psychotherapist or employer of a psychotherapist who
becomes aware through a patient that the patient had alleged
sexual intercourse or alleged sexual contact with a previous
psychotherapist during the course of a prior treatment, shall
provide to the patient a brochure promulgated by the depart-
ment which delineates the rights of, and remedies for, patients
who have been involved sexually with their psychotherapist.
Further, the psychotherapist or employer shall discuss with
the patient the brochure prepared by the department.53
The statute regards as unprofessional conduct the failure to
provide the brochure and to discuss it with the patient.05 Inter-
estingly, this statute does not require a therapist to report the
sexual exploitation of a former patient even though California
has a civil cause of action for former patients that is available
for two years after the termination of therapy.56
Wisconsin leaves the decision of whether to file a report against
the abusing therapist to the patient, but then goes a step fur-
note 1, at 562-65. Actually, Minnesota's mandatory reporting requirements are a patchwork
of requirements pertaining to the various professional boards which predate and postdate
the Minnesota task force's recommendations. See id. at 697-700 (Appendix K, consisting
of summary of reporting requirements in Minnesota).
532. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE S 728 (West 1990).
533. See Wis. STAT. ANN. S 940.22(3)(d) (West Supp. 1990) (makes the failure to report
a misdemeanor).
534. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 728(a). As for the brochure,
(a) The department shall prepare and disseminate an informational brochure
for victims of psychotherapist-patient sexual contact and advocates for those
victims. This brochure shall be developed by the department in consultation
with members of the Sexual Assault Program of the Office of Criminal
Justice Planning and the office of the Attorney General.
(b The brochure shall include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) A legal and an informal definition of psychotherapist-patient sexual
contact.
(2) A brief description of common personal reactions and histories of victims
and victim's families.
(3) A patient's bill of rights.
(4) Options for reporting psychotherapist-patient sexual relations and instruc-
tions for each reporting option.
(5) A full description of administrative, civil, and professional associations
complaint procedures.
(6) A description of services available for support of victims.
Id. S 337.
535. Id. S 728(b).
536. See CAL. CIV. CODE S 43.93(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT SEXUAL CONTACT
ther.537 If the patient wants the subsequent psychotherapist to
file a report and signs a consent to such filing, the subsequent
psychotherapist must file within thirty days a report with the
agency that licenses the offending psychotherapist or with the
district attorney.m The report may not contain information about
the victim's identity without the victim's written consent.09 If
the department or district attorney receives two or more reports
regarding the offending therapist, the department or district
attorney may inform the reporting psychotherapists of that fact;
then the reporting psychotherapists may inform applicable pa-
tients.90 If a person fails to make a required report, he or she
has committed a Class A misdemeanor.51
Although the Wisconsin statute leaves initial control with the
victim, the statute makes it a subsequent psychotherapist's re-
sponsibility to report prior therapist contact if the victim grants
written permission.5 2 This provision will break any "conspiracy
of silence" while protecting patients from embarrassing disclo-
sure. Although California offers a superior education program,
its statute does not create an affirmative duty on the part of the
victim to request a report.
S. Inconsistency in Application
One major disadvantage of board regulation is that authority
over psychotherapists is often fractured and inconsistent. Such
different classes of psychotherapists as social workers, psychol-
ogists, family and marriage counselors, and psychiatrists have
differing regulations.5 Each board maintains control over the
group it licenses. Although some well-funded boards can aggres-
sively pursue cases, other boards have backlogs of several years.5 "
Because differing boards in a given state handle complaints
differently, approaches and outcomes vary from state to state.
Florida provides a classic case in which the fracturing of
authority results in great inconsistencies. Florida licenses both
537. See WIS. STAT. ANN. S 940.22(3)(a).
538. Id. S 940.22(3)(b).
539. Id. 5S 940.22(3(c), (4)(a).
540. Interestingly, a reporting therapist may tell his patient but is not required to do
so. Id. S 940.2240b)(1)-(4).
541. Id. S 940.22(3)(d).
542. Id. S 940.22(3)(a).
543. See supra note 531 (discussing Minnesota mandatory reporting requirements vis-
a-vis different professional boards).
544. See CALIFORIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 22.
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physicians and psychologists.5 45 If a psychiatrist engages in sexual
misconduct with a patient the day after termination of treatment,
he does not violate any medical disciplinary rules. 46 If a Florida
psychologist engages in sexual misconduct with a patient twenty
years after the psychologist-patient relationship terminated, the
psychologist violates the disciplinary rules of the psychology
board, and the recommended penalty is a $1,000 fine and license
revocation.547
C. Summary
Although administrative statutes are no panacea, they form
one of the quickest, most effective means of dealing with psy-
chotherapist misconduct. Fines, loss of license, severe financial
penalties, and criminal sanctions can have a marked deterrent
effect. Cases show that unlicensed psychotlieiapists sexually ex-
ploit their patients;548 however, regulating these unlicensed psy-
chotherapists remains a difficult problem. Licensing can bring
drug, alcohol, marital, and family counselors, as well as other
groups, under regulation. Simply prohibiting the use of the titles
545. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 21R-19.002(13), r. 21U-18.003(l)(k) (1990).
546. Id. r. 21R-19.002(13) ("If the sexual relationship develops outside the physician's
professional practice, no penalty; otherwise fine up to $5,000 and probation to six months
suspension.").
547. Id. r. 21U-18.003(1)(k) (disciplinary guidelines prohibit "[c]ommitting any act upon
a patient or client which would constitute sexual battery or which would constitute sexual
misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111 F[lorida] S[tatutes]. The usual recommended
penalty shall be an administrative fine of $1,000 and revocation"). The Board of Psycho-
logical Examiners in Florida provides:
In accordance with the intent of Chapter 490, Florida Statutes, to preserve
the health, safety and welfare of the public, sexual misconduct as defined
herein is prohibited. The Board finds that the effects of the psychologist-
client relationship are powerful and subtle and that clients are influenced
consciously and subconsciously by the unequal distribution of power inherent
in such relationships. Furthermore, the Board finds that the effects of the
psychologist-client relationship endure after psychological services cease to
be rendered. Therefore, the client shall be presumed incapable of giving
valid, informed, free consent to sexual activity involving the psychologist
and the assertion of consent by the client shall not constitute a defense
against charges of sexual misconduct . ...
For purposes of determining the existence of sexual misconduct
. . . the psychologist-client relationship is deemed to continue in perpetuity.
Id. r. 21U-15.004(1) & (5)(a) (emphasis added).
548. See Kuchan, Survey of Incidence of Psychotherapists' Sexual Contact with Clients in
Wisconsin, in G. SCHOENER & J. MILGROM, supra note 1, at 51-64 (reports the results of
a Wisconsin study on sexual misconduct by therapists, including unlicensed therapists).
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"psychotherapist" and "psychotherapy" by unlicensed practition-
ers may provide a useful measure of public protection.
Deciding whether to require a therapist to report abuse by a
patient's former therapist is perhaps the most difficult issue that
these cases raise. Unless the patient consents to the therapist's
decision to report, the danger of her further injury is very real.
Yet, without mandatory reporting, malpracticing therapists may
harm future patients.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article surveyed and analyzed the problem of psycho-
therapist-patient sexual exploitation and the remedies available
to direct and secondary victims of abuse. Therapists' sexual abuse
of clients is a major problem both in terms of numbers and
impact on the lives of those exploited. Conservative estimates
indicate that approximately ten percent of psychiatrists and
psychologists exploit their patients.r 9 There is, however, limited
available data on the incidence of sexual abuse among unlicensed
psychotherapists.- The number of victims of these unlicensed
practitioners is likely high. Victims of psychotherapist exploita-
tion suffer great personal injury, often requiring hospitalization.
Serious psychological disorders result from the abuse; many
suffer the same symptoms as rape and incest victims. The families
and loved ones of sexually exploited. patients also suffer loss of
companionship, humiliation, and monetary damages.
In recognition of the terrible toll created by unscrupulous
therapists, many jurisdictions have altered their handling of these
cases. Civil negligence claims still constitute the lion's share of
claims that victims bring. Currently, victims of sexual abuse have
up to four avenues of redress: criminal complaints, common law
civil actions, statutory civil actions, and professional board com-
plaints.55'
Seven states have passed criminal statutes aimed specifically
at psychotherapists, and six of these statutes include unlicensed
therapists within their scope.5 52 These statutes preclude consent
as a defense and shift the focus to therapists' fiduciary duty to
avoid taking advantage of their position for sexual gratification-
549. See supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
550. See supra note 548.
551. See supra notes 126-383, 386-462, 470-522 and accompanying text.
552. See supra notes 156-64, 187-90 and accompanying text.
1991] 729
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
perhaps the most important improvement over the common law
rape or sexual assault statutes now in effect. 53
The criminal model does have disadvantages. First, the burden
of proof is extremely difficult for an abused client to meet.
Second, states designed the criminal proceedings not to compen-
sate the victim, but only to punish the accused. Third, the scope
of prohibited behavior under the current statutes is very narrow.
Indeed, sexualized behavior that does not reach the point of
intercourse or sexual contact is not prohibited. Finally, crimi-
nalization of this conduct allows most insurers to deny malprac-
tice coverage, which sometimes precludes the victim from
recovering monetary damages for her injuries.
Under civil common law actions, courts and juries are most
likely to find sexualized, as well as sexual, contact abusive. The
common law covers the widest variety of situations and plaintiffs.
Not only can direct victims of sexual exploitation recover for
injuries sustained due to the relationship, but secondary victims,
such as spouses, also may recover. Additionally, the common law
may provide for employer liability Proving that sexual relations
fall below the standard of care required for a therapist, however,
may be difficult, especially with respect to marginal or "alter-
native" forms of therapy
Other weaknesses also exist. First, courts often consider con-
sent a defense to the action, despite the universal prohibition by
the major therapeutic organizations. Second, no common law
victim shield prevents the defendant from parading the plaintiffs
past sexual history before the courtroom, thus further victimizing
her Finally, the actions of an abusive therapist often render a
patient incapable of coming forward to press a claim until after
the statute of limitations has run.
To rectify some of these concerns, four states have passed civil
statutes making sexual exploitation of patients malpractice per
se. 55 These civil statutes are advantageous over the common law
because they establish the wrongfulness of the behavior, thus
obviating the plaintiffs burden to establish a standard of care.
Some of these states also have lengthened the statute of limita-
tions and included a victim shield law 555 All of the statutes
include former patients within their scope.5 6
553. See supra notes 212-49 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 388-96 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 427-38, 456-60 and accompanying text.
556. See supra notes 414-26 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the civil statutes also have drawbacks. First,
these statutes have unnecessarily restricted the scope of coverage
by adopting their criminal codes' definitions of "sexual contact."
Second, the question whether the statutory civil remedies are
exclusive of or cumulative with common law remedies remains
unanswered. If the statutes are exclusive, then they divest in-
direct victims of sexual exploitation of remedies for legitimate
grievances.
Administrative statutes are the most flexible, and sometimes
the most effective, remedy. An administrative board has wide
latitude to control the actions of its members. Its power of license
suspension and revocation can be a formidable weapon against
registered or licensed therapists. The rules of evidence generally
do not apply as stringently to administrative board proceedings,
and most boards have no statute of limitations.
Although board regulation can be the most effective means of
stopping sexually exploitative therapists, it can also be the worst.
Boards can regulate and scrutinize only their members, thus
excluding unlicensed therapists from review.55 7 In addition, a
board's effectiveness depends on its jurisdiction and composition.
Many boards are professional and ambitious and will attempt to
rid their professions of substandard practitioners; but others,
akin to the proverbial fox guarding the chicken coop, are inca-
pable of overcoming the conflict of interest- inherent in this form
of self-regulation and are thus unlikely to prosecute their col-
leagues. Furthermore, many states have more than one board
governing psychotherapists, which resultsin fractured authority
and inconsistencies.
For all of the new enactments and differing solutions to this
problem, no one approach clearly suffices to protect society and
victims from exploitative therapists or to compensate all victims
for their injuries. To be truly effective, each jurisdiction should
combine criminal, civil, and administrative remedies. In addition,
states should more closely synchronize board regulations among
the states and especially within each state. They should give
special attention to the plight of former patients and possibly to
expanding the statute of limitations.
All jurisdictions face the issue of therapist-patient sexual abuse
in one form or another. This area of the law is expanding as
public sensitivity to the problem increases. Unfortunately, the
557. Some states have attempted to close this loophole, most notably Minnesota,
Colorado, and Florida. See supra note 472.
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law's growth merely reflects a growth in the number of patients
injured by sexual abuse. The development of a comprehensive
legal scheme, coupled with professional and consumer education,
is crucial to amelioration of the problem.""
558. In Massachusetts, State Rep. Barbara Gardner, chairperson of a special committee
on the sexual misconduct of physicians, therapists, and other related health care profes-
sionals, divided the work on the special committee into education, civillcriminal statutes,
victims, professional associations, and board subcommittees. Each subcommittee is co-
chaired by a member of the House of Representatives. This organizational structure
should produce coherent, well-organized legislation. Meeting of Special Subcommittee of
the House, Physician/Therapist Misconduct, Commonwealth of Mass., House of Rep. (May
25, 1989). Task forces in Minnesota and California have reiterated the same goals. See
CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF TASK FORCE, supra note 156, at 8-37; MINNESOTA, REPORT OF TASK
FORCE, supra note 156, at 15-42.
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